

"*Latin American Immigration Ethics* takes seriously the heterogeneity of experiences that makes up Latin American immigration and lends it philosophical dimension. A significant contribution to the literature, the essays included here are singularly unique. Required reading for anyone interested in this topic."

Carlos Alberto Sánchez, author of *A Sense of Brutality: Philosophy After Narco-Culture*

*Latin American Immigration Ethics* advances philosophical conversations and debates about immigration by theorizing migration from the Latin American and Latinx contexts. Without eschewing relevant conceptual resources derived from European and Anglo-American philosophies, the essays in this book emphasize Latin American and Latinx philosophies, decolonial and feminist theories, and Indigenous philosophies of Latin America in the pursuit of an immigration ethics. The contributors explore the moral challenges of immigration that either arise within Latin America, or when Latin Americans and Latina/o/xs migrate to and reside within the United States, addressing the lacuna of philosophical writing on migration, maternity, and childhood.

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LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION ETHICS

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AMY REED-SANDOVAL AND  
LUIS RUBÉN DÍAZ CEPEDA

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Edited by  
Amy Reed-Sandoval and  
Luis Rubén Díaz Cepeda



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## PART I

### Methodological Foundations

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## CHAPTER 1

# Latin American Immigration Ethics

### *A Roadmap*

AMY REED-SANDOVAL AND  
LUIS RUBÉN DÍAZ CEPEDA

### Introduction

“Mainstream” philosophy of immigration has generally been written without reference to Latin American history or philosophy, despite the fact Latin Americans (and particularly Mexicans and Central Americans) are widely regarded as “quintessential” migrants in places like the United States. This is not to discredit such scholarship, developed as it has in the Anglo-American and European traditions. Certainly, this body of work has generated useful conceptual resources with which to question, among other things, the very legitimacy of immigration restrictions. Still, in neglecting not only ethically relevant aspects of Latin American migrations throughout their history but also Latin American philosophies *about* these processes, mainstream immigration philosophy delivers an incomplete vision of immigration justice. We submit that what ought to be a collective, global effort to achieve immigration justice must engage Latin American immigration ethics.

One might suspect that this is impossible because there do not seem to be any distinctively “Latin American immigration ethics” to engage. Indeed, it may appear that migration theory is the domain of philosophers in recognized “receiving countries.” Contrary to such a view, in this chapter we propose that a distinctive Latin American immigration ethics does exist, even if it has not yet been articulated as such. Latin American immigration ethics, we argue, (often) has two characteristics. First, it focuses on lived,

contextualized migratory experiences of Latin Americans within and outside of the geographical region of Latin America. This can be contrasted to a highly abstract approach to immigration ethics that seeks out universally applicable moral norms to guide us to immigration justice everywhere (sometimes called the “open borders debate,” which we discuss later).<sup>1</sup> Second, Latin American immigration ethics offers conceptual frameworks for achieving immigration justice that call upon the ideas of Latin American philosophers. Following our discussion in the introduction to this volume, we conceive the term “Latin American philosopher” broadly, such that it includes not only academic philosophers but also artists, public intellectuals, and migrants themselves generating philosophical ideas in a Latin American context. Note that we do not present either characteristic as a necessary condition for a piece of work to “count” as Latin American immigration ethics. Our aim is to offer a roadmap rather than construct new scholarly borders. We hope that this chapter, as well as the others in this volume, will encourage a proliferation of philosophical and empirical work on immigration through a Latin American philosophical lens.

This chapter is organized as follows: First, we provide a sketch of immigrations/migrations in Latin American history, from the colonization of the Americas to the present. Second, we explore three key examples of how Latin American philosophers have engaged this history. These include (1) Latin American philosophical work on exile; (2) Latinx philosophy (including Latina feminist philosophy) about Latin American and Latinx perspectives on living in, and migrating to, the United States; and (3) the notion of *trans-modernidad*, developed in the context of Enrique Dussel’s liberation philosophy, which provides philosophical guidance for a system of more open borders in an increasingly integrated Latin America.

Our conclusion briefly discusses how Latin American immigration ethics delivers important philosophical insights and proposals for achieving immigration justice. Finally, we list several areas in which Latin American immigration ethics could benefit from further philosophical work and development.

## I. Immigrations/Migrations in Latin American History

Normative and empirical migration scholarship has focused predominantly on South-North migration. However, understanding Latin American migra-

tion ethics requires us to reorient our focus toward South-South and North-South (or Center-Periphery) migrations.<sup>2</sup> The term “South-South” migration designates the migratory movements in which both the sending and receiving countries are situated in the Global South. In Latin America, such movements may occur when migrants do not have the intention of reaching the Global North, opting instead to enter and remain in a neighboring Latin American country. South-South migrations also occur when migrants attempt to reach a Global North country but are prevented from doing so due to factors such as health issues and restrictive immigration enforcement mechanisms encountered along the way. North-South migrations occur when migrants leave Global North countries—which tend to be former colonial powers—and relocate to the Global South. Such migrations, as we shall now explore, have transpired since the colonization of Latin America.

Indeed, understanding Latin American immigration history requires us to travel back to the fifteenth century, to the roots of the current cultural and political structure.<sup>3</sup> At the beginning of the colonial period, thousands of Europeans, overwhelmingly from Spain and Portugal, migrated to the Americas. Enslaved Africans were forcibly transported to the Western Hemisphere and forced to work in the “New World’s” burgeoning mines. Illnesses borne by Europeans decimated a large percentage of the Native population, leaving Latin America with extensive uninhabited territories that would continue attracting European migrants in the following centuries. Meanwhile, Indigenous women were often forced into new, oppressive gender roles by Spanish colonizers.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, as Raúl Villarreal explores in this volume, violent colonization and enslavement should be regarded as core aspects of Latin American migratory history.

North-South migrations to Latin America did not end when Latin American countries achieved formal independence from Spain and Portugal in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In fact, migration from southern Europe to Latin America continued over the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.<sup>5</sup> Latin American political elites encouraged this translocation of an estimated eleven million people, on the grounds that European migration would “improve the race” in Latin America. (The basis of this attitude is expressed in Domingo Sarmiento’s book *Facundo o civilización y barbarie*, in which he argues that “blacks and Indians were behind in the march of civilization” and wonders “if it had not been a mistake, during the colonial era, [to] incorporate indigenous people into the life of the Spanish.”)<sup>6</sup> As Norambuena claims, in countries



like Chile, this idea of “racial improvement” generated an “ideology of migration” that facilitated the creation of attractive conditions for Europeans to settle there.<sup>7</sup> Argentina and Uruguay also offered this type of deference to European migrants (particularly Italians). Additionally, from 1939 to 1942, Mexico received between twenty and twenty-five thousand Spanish refugees and exiles who migrated in order to escape from Francisco Franco’s dictatorship—a process that became known as the *Exilio Español* (we shall return to exile in the Latin American context in the next section). Some of these exiles, such as José Gaos and Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, found fertile soil in the growing intellectual sphere in Mexico and contributed significantly to the development of academic philosophy in that country.<sup>8</sup>

The decline of this particular wave of European immigration coincided with the development of Latin American urban centers. Starting in the 1930s, there was a vast internal migration from the countryside to large cities throughout the region.<sup>9</sup> At first, this movement transpired within the limits of national boundaries. Later, it morphed into an interregional migration stream originating in the borderlands of Latin America, “where ethnic identities or pre-established ties . . . connected populations beyond the political demarcation of the territories.”<sup>10</sup> Soon enough, foreigners (from within Latin America) were relocating from Latin American borderlands to regional urban centers. Miguel Villa and Jorge Martínez point out that a scarce availability of information and the difficulty to standardize national databases (i.e., census information) make it challenging to establish the exact numbers of Latin Americans migrating from one “local” country to another during this period.<sup>11</sup> However, it is possible to identify at least some general patterns.

By the mid-nineteenth century, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Venezuela were receiving a significant number of migrants from neighboring countries such as Colombia, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Chile.<sup>12</sup> For the most part, this involved peasants and working-class individuals—for example, most migrants from Bolivia, Paraguay, and Chile worked in the agricultural industry in Argentina. Later, in the 1970s, the Venezuelan oil industry attracted many migrants from Colombia.<sup>13</sup> Given that these workers were considered necessary for the development of the recipient economies, their immigration was not considered controversial until the later part of that decade.<sup>14</sup> Rather, they were generally accepted in Venezuela and were able to regularize their immigration status with ease (for further exploration of this topic, see Allison B. Wolf’s contribution to this volume).

New migration trends occurred in the 1980s, as political conflicts and resulting violence in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala compelled large numbers of people to flee those countries. While most Central Americans fled to the United States, many also sought refuge in Mexico and Costa Rica. Responding to this influx, Costa Rica agreed to “legalize” these migrants.<sup>15</sup> In the midst of these conflicts in Central America, the economic situation in Latin America deteriorated to the point that 1980s were dubbed the region’s “lost decade.”

The economic crisis of the “lost decade” came about as follows: During the 1970s, within the context of the Cold War, countries were debating the kind of economic model they should follow. Argentina and Mexico opted for a government-driven process of industrialization, wherein they imported technology in an attempt to upgrade their industries. Meanwhile, as industrialized countries increased their loan-rate interest, Latin American countries were forced to devalue their currency. The heightened interest rates and depreciated currency caused external debt to increase to the point at which it became impossible to pay. This “unbearable debt” was then instrumentalized by the International Monetary Fund to promote an agenda of liberalizing Latin American economies, including a dismantling of the region’s welfare state. These factors, in turn, pushed a larger number of people to leave for the United States and Western Europe, where they were often not well received. Many of those unable or unwilling to go to North America or Europe migrated to other countries within Latin America, which they often found easily accessible.

Thus far in this section, we have aimed to center Latin America’s deep histories of South-South and North-South/Center-Periphery migrations. However, we must also acknowledge the historical and sociopolitical importance of South-North Latin American migration, particularly to the United States. Note first, however, that Latin Americans and Latina/o/xs in the United States did not always “end up” there through migration. In 1848, through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ending the Mexican-American War, the U.S. government violently seized nearly half of Mexico’s territory, leaving countless Mexicans with an ambiguous immigration status on their own lands.

A range of subsequent immigration laws, policies, and enforcement practices served to reify the status of Mexicans and other Latin Americans as an oppressed social group in the United States. For instance, the Johnson-Reed Act, or the Immigration Act of 1924, compelled the U.S. government to focus on controlling the Mexico-U.S. border as a major component of its

immigration policy. According to Mae Ngai, the Johnson-Reed act made Mexicans paradigmatic “illegal” subjects.<sup>16</sup> Later, during the Great Depression, immigration enforcement officials repatriated over a million ethnic Mexicans—including U.S. citizens who had never been to Mexico—to that country. Shortly thereafter, the Bracero Program invited Mexican workers back into the United States under highly exploitative conditions.

Today, the social “illegalization” of Latin Americans and Latina/o/xs in the United States persists, even as their labor continues to be regarded as “essential” during the COVID-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, the increased militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border, exacerbated by the controversial Prevention Through Deterrence Policy, has led to countless migrant deaths. Female and transgender migrants have been harmed considerably by U.S. immigration enforcement mechanisms, which leave them vulnerable to rape and assault during the increasingly arduous journey toward and across a heavily militarized border. Children who attempt to migrate from Latin America to the United States are also highly vulnerable; in 2018 the administration of Donald Trump began forcibly separating them from their parents in immigration detention centers (for an exploration of other ethical challenges faced by Latin American and Latina/o/x children living in the United States, see Lori Gallegos de Castillo’s contribution to this volume).

Finally, and to conclude this section, we propose that understanding migration in a Latin American context requires us to think in terms of an *integrated Latin America*, both real and imagined. Simón Bolívar originally conceived of “the idea of a Pan-American identity: that is to say, a sense of a shared and restricted life experience lived on a commonly-possessed territory and within a set of trans-temporal and trans-individual cultural patterns.”<sup>17</sup> One could argue that Bolívar’s dream has, in important respects, been kept alive through several prominent attempts to develop a united Latin America. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Andean Community of Nations, and South Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR) reflect this ideal. These bodies facilitate the migration and residence of citizens of member countries within the framework of an emerging common market and community space. For instance, in the case of MERCOSUR, these efforts “include major agreements on free movement and equal rights for member state nationals, residency norms and ongoing negotiations to put in place a statute on regional citizenship.”<sup>18</sup>

It is important to note that the idea of an integrated Latin American generally follows the Zapatista principle of building a “world where many worlds fit.” An *inclusive* Latin America acknowledges its debt to Indigenous people and recognizes them as a valid and useful source of knowledge. Reaching an integrated Latin America in those terms would have fortunate geopolitical and theoretical consequences. Geopolitically, it is likely that countries sharing resources and finding solutions to common problems would improve the social and economic conditions of their inhabitants. A stronger Latin America would also be better positioned to challenge the hegemonic colonial discourse that sets the region in a position of inferiority. This improved position could also improve the quality of life on Latina/o/xs living in the Global North, as they would not be forced to live as migrants if they do not want to and, if they did choose to migrate, would likely endure less discrimination after doing so from a position of strength.

In theoretical terms, an integrated Latin America would reveal the relevance of other ways of living and knowing such as *buen vivir* (from the Aymara expression *sumac kamaña*, which can be translated as “living in fullness and harmony with the Pachamama”). This perspective of having a “full life” refers not to an accumulation of material possessions but to a life in communion with nature and our fellow human beings. Note that when we say “fellow human beings” we do not refer to an abstraction but to the concrete materiality of the flesh and blood of other people—especially of those who suffer the greatest inequities and whom Enrique Dussel calls the victims of the system. We propose that developing a community-oriented epistemology in an integrated Latin America will help us to reconceptualize immigration justice in terms of what Dussel terms a preferential option for the poor. We explore these ideas in relation to Dussel’s arguments supporting more open borders in Latin America later in this chapter.

## II. Latin American Philosophies of Migration

As we explore in this section, Latin American and Latina/o/x philosophers have responded to the migratory histories delineated above in novel ways, offering conceptual resources of relevance to normative, empirical, and policy-oriented discussions of migration justice.

### A. Latin American Philosophies of Exile

One distinctive contribution of Latin American philosophy to the philosophy of migration comes in the form of reflections on exile. The fact that Latin American philosophers have focused on exile in particular (as a migratory experience) can be partially attributed to the widespread importance of banishment as an exclusionary mechanism—indeed, its status as a “major constitutive feature of Latin American politics”<sup>19</sup>—dating back to the colonization of the Americas, when, in a well-established process known as *destierro*, perceived deviants from Spain and Portugal were forcibly sent to the Americas. Conversely, during this time, “disturbers of the peace” from Latin America were frequently exiled back to those colonial “centers.” Given the importance of exile in Latin American immigration ethics, let us say a bit more here about the practice in Latin American history.

Exile was frequently employed as a relatively “easy” solution to political dissent during and after the Latin American wars of independence of the early nineteenth century. Note that throughout most of the region’s history, banishment, as opposed to slavery and/or execution, was only offered to relatively privileged, white elites, who were frequently able to join communities of *exiliados*, or *desterrados*, in their new countries. For example, whereas the Inca/Indigenous monarch Túpac Amaru, of what is now Vilcabamba, Peru, was executed by Spanish colonizers after a failed attempt to defend the sovereignty of the Neo-Inca State, centuries later, the upper-class Simón Bolívar died in exile in Europe after leading wars of independence in six Latin American countries.

In more recent history, exile in, and from, Latin America has lost some (but not all) of its elitist connotations. As we noted earlier, following World War II and the Spanish Civil War, European exiles, who were not always upper class, built new homes and communities in Latin America—particularly in Mexico, Argentina, and Chile. Fidel Castro and other Cuban dissidents went into exile in Mexico (where Castro met Che Guevara), where they planned for what became the Cuban Revolution. As a result of a series of coups and subsequent military repression in South America in the 1960s and 1970s, thousands of exiles from Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay sought refuge in other Latin American countries, including Nicaragua after the Sandinista Revolution. While this history raises important questions about the distinctions between exiles, refugees, and migrants, Sznajder and Roniger offer a

sufficiently broad definition to argue that exile, qua political mechanism in Latin America, has become more “inclusive” in terms of its application:

Exile is a multifaceted phenomenon that can be analyzed from a sociological, psychological, historical, cultural, anthropological, economic, literary, artistic, and geographic point of view. It relates not only to expulsion from a country but also to reception by host countries, to a dynamics of longing for return, and eventually to the return itself. It involves processes of transnational, regional, and global acculturation and translocation of political, social, administrative, and cultural models from abroad to the home society.<sup>20</sup>

For present purposes, let us assume this broad definition of exile and turn to some of the conceptual tools that Latin American philosophers have provided in order to analyze and understand it. In what remains of this section, we explore two philosophers who have done a considerable amount of work on the topic: Uruguayan Mexican philosopher Carlos Pereda and Argentinian Mexican philosopher Silvana Rabinovich.

More specifically, Pereda has offered a book-length treatment of exile that philosophically engages the “metatestimonies” on their experiences offered by exiled poets and philosophers in Latin America. He argues that metatestimonies—unlike the contents of, say, ethnographic interviews—are explicitly offered up for critical analysis.<sup>21</sup> According to Pereda, exile should be understood both in terms of a series of phases and as an experience that brings about a unique philosophical perspective.

In the first phase, the exiled person feels a profound, wrenching sense of loss that shatters their very sense of self. Subsequently, the exiled person enters the phase of “resistance,” which begins as anger toward one’s political opponents but eventually becomes creative and productive, enabling them to rebuild a coherent personal identity. Later still, exile becomes a threshold at which the exiled person builds new ways of experiencing, understanding, and living in the host country. Pereda pays considerable attention to the work of María Zambrano, the Spanish philosopher of the Generation of ’36, who lived in several countries as an exile after her opposition to Franco during the Spanish Civil War. For Pereda, Zambrano exemplifies how exile produces “ruptures” that bring out fresh philosophical and political perspectives (i.e., in Zambrano’s discussion of “reason” in terms of a willingness to forge new beginnings).

Notably, Pereda does not merely *describe* exile. He also makes normative statements about the importance of experiencing exile as profound loss, and then recovery, and then creative threshold: “We must not objectify a bottomless plunge into melancholy, for anyone who is incapable of taking a step backward and adopting a third person point of view in order to understand their place of suffering will forever remain a prisoner in their orgies of hyperbole.”<sup>22</sup> So we might add a third element to Pereda’s description of exile: threshold-as-*requirement*. Importantly, Pereda’s theory does not merely place a normative burden on migrants/exiles themselves. He compels the reader to imagine, and even try to think from, the migrant’s/exile’s own point of view. We are compelled, furthermore, to regard that point of view as a source of wisdom and innovation in relation to life in a new world.

Meanwhile, Silvana Rabinovich offers an analysis of exile that, somewhat similarly, traces both the oppression and creative potential inherent in exile. However, her work serves to complicate certain standard assumptions about exile, for she introduces the notion of *exilio domiciliario*—or “exile at home”—to analyze the experiences of various politically oppressed groups, including Native Americans, Palestinians in refugee camps, and the Sawari people living under European colonialism. Rabinovich notes that groups that are “exiled at home” are expected (and often violently compelled) to integrate into dominant sociopolitical culture while renouncing their distinctiveness. While the various groups assessed by Rabinovich in her bottom-up philosophical analysis certainly experience exile in different ways, they all experience “exile at home” through “losing the land beneath their feet.”

Rabinovich then attends to the creative, epistemic, and political dimensions of exile. She suggests, for instance, that the “marginality” of exile calls into question the principles of the capitalist nation-state.<sup>23</sup> Exile is also utopian, she argues, compelling us to rethink the possible and impossible (especially in the realm of the political). Finally, like Pereda, Rabinovich offers an account of exile with normative dimensions. She maintains that individual exiled persons ought to embrace utopian reimaginations while resisting integration into the positivist ethos of their host countries. Recently, Rabinovich applied her account of exile to the COVID-19 pandemic, arguing that experiences of quarantine and social isolation can help nonexiled people empathize with the experiences of “exiles at home” who have had the land beneath their feet taken from them.<sup>24</sup>

The respective works on exile by Rabinovich and Pereda exemplify how Latin American philosophers have developed unique conceptual resources in response to the region’s particular immigration/migration history, in which exile has played an important role. It is worth noting that Anglo-American and European immigration philosophies have not, as a general rule, theorized exile, focusing instead on the experiences of immigrants (documented and undocumented) and refugees.<sup>25</sup> This brief survey of Pereda’s and Rabinovich’s respective works also demonstrates a key theme of Latin American migration ethics, which will emerge in the ensuing sections: an emphasis on theory *from the migrant’s point of view*.

## B. Latinx Immigration Philosophy

Let us now turn to Latinx philosophies of migration—that is, philosophies of migration that focus mainly on the migratory experiences of Latin Americans and Latina/o/xs in the United States. As we shall see, Latinx immigration philosophers have paid particular attention to Latina/o/x encounters with immigration-related restrictions, enforcement mechanisms, and stereotypes. In addition, José Jorge Mendoza explains that “Latinx philosophers are not only already providing challenges to standard open-borders debates, but also challenging the very nature of the ethics of immigration” (for a discussion of the relationship between Latinx immigration philosophy and decolonial theory, see Mendoza’s contribution to this volume).<sup>26</sup> Following Mendoza’s example, we explore in this section not only Latinx philosophical work on contextualized Latina/o/x immigration experiences but also how Latinx immigration philosophers have challenged and even sidelined the “open borders debate” of Anglo-American political philosophy of immigration. In so doing, Latinx immigration philosophers offer new resources for pursuing immigration ethics.

To begin to understand the distinctive contributions of Latinx philosophers to the ethics of migration, let us first turn to Gloria Anzaldúa’s seminal work *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*. In *Borderlands*, Anzaldúa explores how the immigration restrictions targeting U.S. Latina/o/xs, particularly in the Mexico-U.S. borderlands region, contribute to Mexican American and Chicana/o/x identity and oppression.<sup>27</sup> She famously called the Mexico-U.S. border an “*una herida abierta* [an open wound] where the

Third World grates against the first and bleeds.”<sup>28</sup> In doing so, Anzaldúa has conveyed the intimate nature of immigration restrictions for many Latina/o/x/s. Indeed, she describes her own upbringing at the border as a form of “intimate terrorism” that contributed to the formation of her Chicana identity. Anzaldúa tells the story of Pedro, a Mexican American adolescent farmworker who was apprehended and deported to Mexico—where he had never lived—despite his U.S. citizenship. As Anzaldúa explains, immigration enforcement mechanisms serve to “mark” racialized, working-class bodies as “illegal” regardless of citizenship status. In many respects, Anzaldúa’s work set the stage for more recent Latinx immigration philosophy by establishing that immigration restrictions, including borders, are much more than the subject matter of largely abstract philosophical debates. They are, in fact, inextricably connected to many aspects of Chicana/o/x and Latina/o/x identity, subjectivity, experience, and oppression.

Latinx immigration philosophy has continued this Anzaldúan tradition of theorizing on the basis of Latin Americans’ lived experiences of immigration restrictions. Grant Silva, for instance, writes that “borders are . . . bolstered by such things as racial, ethnic, or religious difference, even when such differences are the product of national imaginaries. When borders assume these contexts, they become more than just lines in the sand; they become ‘color lines.’”<sup>29</sup> Such arguments urge us to think critically about what borders actually *are*, as well as their relationship to social identity formation. Thinking both from and “beyond” the U.S.-Mexico border, Ernesto Rosen Velásquez argues that the competing claims of “economic progress versus the threat of Latin Americans in the north . . . have resulted in a checkered history of massive deportations, bracero programs, periods of amnesty, massacres, riots, and daily harassment of immigrants and others who may look like laborers.”<sup>30</sup> Velásquez’s analysis focuses on how “visible Latina/o/x identity” intersects with class in ways that can render one particularly vulnerable to immigrant enforcement mechanisms.<sup>31</sup> Other Latinx immigration philosophers have assessed the relationship between immigration restrictions targeting Latin Americans and Latina/o/xs and the very *personhood* of those targeted. As Carlos Alberto Sanchez argues, “certain legislative moves both *thingify* and push undocumented migrants outside the space of the human.”<sup>32</sup>

In addition to this body of scholarship on the relationship between immigration restrictions and Latin American and Latina/o/x identity and oppression, Latinx philosophers have also made important contributions to the

philosophical “open borders debate” of analytic/Anglo-American political philosophy. By way of review, this scholarly conversation has explored in abstract and largely “ideal” fashion the question of whether states may justly exclude any prospective immigrants whatsoever. On the one side stands the so-called conventional view that sovereign states are entitled to such exclusionary acts;<sup>33</sup> philosophers who support it frequently couch their arguments in terms of the protection of societal culture, freedom of association, and the belief that immigration restrictions do not necessarily violate the moral equality of the excluded (for further discussion on the imperative to “protect society cultures” in relation to Indigenous migration, see Amy Reed-Sandoval’s contribution to this volume). So-called open borders theorists, on the other hand, frequently argue against immigration restrictions by appealing to the values like autonomy, social equality, and the pursuit of a meaningful life for immigrants and other border-crossers. Some also emphasize the value of free markets, stressing the right of employers to hire whomever they wish—including foreigners—for a particular job.

It is to this debate that Latinx philosophers have made unique interventions that deserve recognition here.<sup>34</sup> For instance, Jorge M. Valadez and José-Antonio Orosco have debated how we should understand states *themselves* in the context of normative discussions of immigration. Valadez argues that even though modern states have, generally speaking, achieved their power through wrongful means, they may possess a form of conditional legitimacy, as part of which they may operate justly in the present despite their unjust past.<sup>35</sup> Orosco, meanwhile, argues that states not only perform certain administrative functions but also protect societal cultures. On such a view of states, certain segments of the public may see immigrants as threatening societal cultures. Immigration justice therefore demands that states like the United States develop openness to, and appreciation of, the unique contributions that immigrants bring.<sup>36</sup> As these examples show, Latinx philosophers have made important contributions to the open borders debate, often by way of centering the experiences of immigrants themselves.

Latina feminist philosophy is generally read and discussed separately from philosophical work, Latinx or otherwise, on immigration justice. However, it is important to note that this tradition draws attention to a range of migration ethics challenges experienced by Latin Americans, Latina/o/xs, and other marginalized immigrant groups—as illustrated in Natalie Cisneros’s study of the widespread phenomenon so-called anchor baby stereotyping

and the ways in which the latter reveals how the bodies of immigrant women of color are frequently regarded as “always, already perverse.”<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, Latina feminist writers have also articulated how the crossing and recrossing of borders—physical, epistemic, and metaphorical—produce for many Latinas an experience of “in-betweenness,” which Mariana Ortega describes in terms of “*multiplicitous selfhood*, of selves characterized by *being-between-worlds*, *being-in-worlds*, and *becoming-with*.”<sup>38</sup>

In “Playfulness, World-Traveling, and Loving Perception,” María Lugones offers an influential account of the sort of “in-betweenness” discussed by Ortega, exploring how “women of color in the U.S. practice ‘world’-traveling,” mostly out of necessity.<sup>39</sup> Like Ortega, Lugones argues that these practices of “world”-traveling—which come, in part, from negotiating hostile aspects of the society one currently inhabits as a woman of color and marked “other”—generate not only burdens but also a unique epistemic standpoint from which to view, assess, and come to understand the world. On the one hand, Lugones refers to literal travels and border crossings, as she discusses her experiences growing up in Argentina and moving to the United States. On the other hand, the sorts of “borders” and “worlds” she explores include racial, cultural, and other boundaries with which women of color must contend. As Lugones writes, “the reason why I think traveling to someone’s ‘world’ is a way of identifying with them is because by traveling to their world we can understand *what it is to be them and what it is to be ourselves in their eyes*.”<sup>40</sup>

Thus far, we have seen that Latina feminist philosophers have theorized the unique epistemic standpoint that Latinas (and other women of color) in the United States often develop as they navigate material and figurative borders and the state of *being-between-worlds*. In addition to this, these thinkers have also developed strategies for contending with such border crossings. Ortega, for instance, explores *hometactics*, which she describes as “practices that allow for a sense of familiarity with and a particular sense of ‘belonging to’ a place, space, or group while avoiding the restrictive, exclusive elements that a notion of belonging might carry with it.”<sup>41</sup> Hometactics involve everyday strategies, self-mappings, and the uncovering of what multiplicitous selves are already doing in order to navigate an existential state of in-betweenness.<sup>42</sup> Another strategy of Latina feminists, identified by Stephanie Rivera Berruz, is that of “translation and translocation,” through which Latina and Latin American feminists “consider the importance and context of migrations of ideas in a globalized world.”<sup>43</sup> Rivera Berruz explores how

Latina feminists often cultivate a hemispheric approach to feminist theorizing. Additionally, Latina feminists have articulated strategies for engaging in collective, mutually supportive scholarship that challenge systems of marginalization in the discipline of philosophy, such as the Roundtable on Latina Feminism.<sup>44</sup>

In sum, we have seen that Latinx philosophy, including Latina feminist philosophy, has made considerable contributions to theorizing the ethics of migration. This body of scholarship both focuses on the unique, contextualized experiences of Latin American and Latina/o/x migrations (in this case, in the United States) and generates new conceptual frameworks for pursuing immigration ethics. Furthermore, like Latin American philosophies of exile, Latinx immigration philosophy often theorizes (or aims to theorize) from a migrant’s point of view.<sup>45</sup> Latinx philosophers engage, challenge, and even sidestep the open borders debate, offering important new frameworks, such as hometactics (Ortega), thingification (Sanchez), and translation and translocation (Rivera Berruz). All the while, Latinx philosophers of immigration tend to uphold an “Anzaldúan tradition” of assessing the intimate relationship between immigration restrictions and Latina/o/x identity itself.

### C. Liberation Philosophy and Immigration

In this section, we consider an alternative approach to immigration ethics developed in the Global South: an inclusive immigration system based on the ethical duty to respond to the Other. In so doing, we should first note the exclusionary nature of a colonial discourse that promotes the idea of nation-states founded on notions of one unique identity. Within such a discourse, “local cultures are left for dead or expected to die before long, because their condition is one of unquestionable inferiority according to the colonizer’s gaze and has no future of its own.”<sup>46</sup> When implemented, this ideology is used to generate barriers to both external and internal migration. Borders are closed to prevent non-natives from entering a nation, while exclusionary social practices draw an internal borderline between those who “belong” to the dominant culture and Others who do not. In opposition to such Othering and xenophobia, Enrique Dussel’s philosophy of liberation argues for an inclusive system inspired by the lessons learned from the global “periphery.” Here, we outline the contours of an ethics of immigration grounded in the ethical principles of Dussel’s philosophy.

First, some background. The philosophy of liberation “defines itself as a counter-philosophical discourse, whether it be as a critique of colonialism, imperialism, globalization, racism, and sexism, which is articulated from out of the experience of exploitation, destitution, alienation and reification, in the name of the projects of liberation, autonomy and authenticity.”<sup>47</sup> In a strict sense, it emerged in Argentina in the 1960s and then spread to the rest of Latin America in 1975 during the “Philosophy Encounter” in Morelia, Mexico, where Enrique Dussel and Arturo Andrés Roig presented two groundbreaking papers. It should be noted that from the outset, the philosophy of liberation has featured diverse scholarly approaches.<sup>48</sup> However, on a global scale, Dussel is mostly responsible for bringing about its development and fruition. Hence, it is to his philosophy that we will be referring to in this section—specifically to his concept of transmodernity in relation to the ethics of immigration.

In *Ethics of Liberation*, Dussel develops the following three ethical imperatives: the material, formal, and feasibility principles. The material principle refers to “the obligation to produce, reproduce and develop the concrete human life of each ethical subject in community.”<sup>49</sup> Here, Dussel argues that to *have human life* is one of the fundamentals of ethics, for without life no ethics would be needed. Indeed, no ethical system can feasibly advocate for the elimination of life, as that would be self-destroying. A second key element of this principle pertains to the ethical subject in the community. Its importance resides in the idea that a person is a member of the community insofar as the actions of that community affect him or her, *regardless of whether they legally belong to it*.

The formal principle serves as the procedural mediation of the material ethical principle, and, as Dussel explains, “it is a universal standard to ‘apply’ the content (with practical truth or as a mediation for the production, reproduction and development of human life of each ethical subject) of the normative statement.”<sup>50</sup> This is to say that since community members are alive, they need to agree on the norms that are necessary to protect human life through symmetrical participation. This “intersubjective consensus” gives validity to the norms upon which they agree.

Finally, the feasibility principle “determines the scope of what can be done [. . .] within the horizon of (a) of what is ethically permitted [and] (b) to what must necessarily be operated.”<sup>51</sup> In other words, an ethical commu-

nity must always strive toward higher ethical behavior, while simultaneously acknowledging that certain norms cannot be met. For example, a flawless legal system is impossible to attain as humans are imperfect beings, but an ethical community still can use this ideal to lead its actions.

It should be pointed out that these principles are not ordered hierarchically. They are unified, and for an act to be ethical, it must meet all three. The lives of the members of the ethical community must be protected by the norms they have agreed on within the limits of feasibility. If community members are alive but have no say in the decisions that affect them, their lives lack in dignity. Furthermore, it is likely that in time, their material conditions will deteriorate to the point where their very lives are threatened. Also, when making decisions, community members must consider the feasibility of their project; failing to do so may amount to endangering people’s lives. It is also important to recognize that feasibility changes over time; what may seem impossible now may be attainable in other times and circumstances. Lastly, these principles reach their full potential when the critical dimension is added. This is to say that we should apply them with the well-being of all in mind but give preference to the victims of the system (particularly the most vulnerable among them). Indeed, victims are usually both hidden by the system and existing outside of it. However, as Aníbal Quijano points out, they are, in fact, constitutive of the system.<sup>52</sup>

With this background in mind, let us now turn to Dussel’s project of transmodernity, which we apply to the ethics of immigration. Based on the system of ethics we just delineated, Dussel’s transmodernist project confirms the need for “the essential components of modernity’s own excluded cultures in order to develop a new civilization for the twenty-first century.”<sup>53</sup> Unlike modernity and its false neutrality, and postmodernity and its neutralizing relativism, Dussel proposes a system in which the *locus enuntiationis* (place of enunciation) is not only acknowledged but also plays a vital role. This is because to talk, or think, from the perspective of conquered people is not equivalent to speaking from a position of privilege. Once these differences are recognized and the voice of the Other is heard, we are ready to have a meaningful dialogue in favor of life, especially human life. In Linda Alcoff’s words, “Modernity must be transcended by a retelling of its history, which will reincorporate the other who it has abolished to the periphery and downgraded epistemologically and politically.”<sup>54</sup> This proposal is still being



developed, but it is clear that a future transmodern culture will “have a rich diversity and will be the fruit of a genuine intercultural dialogue, which must clearly take into account existing asymmetries.”<sup>55</sup>

While Dussel’s philosophy of liberation has not directly reflected on immigration (for more on this, see Amos Nascimento’s and Margaret Griesse’s co-authored contribution to this volume), it is clear that his theoretical categories could be of great use for a Latin American immigration ethics. For instance, the ethical duty to respond to the Other, and to try to think from the Other’s perspective, compels us to learn how respond to the needs of the migrants in an open, inclusive manner. This inclusion does not mean to immerse migrants completely in the predominant culture of the receiving country but, rather, to respect and value their diversity. For Dussel, it is that very diversity that leads to growth and the revealing of truth. The transmodern project—which seems to support, in many respects, an open borders position, does not advocate for the complete elimination of borders. Rather, it calls for an ethical immigration system that is open to Otherness. Such an immigration system would protect the lives of immigrants through norms agreed upon by the ethical community—which, once again, includes immigrants—within the limits of what is feasible.

Recent developments in Bolivian politics offer us an important example of a Dusselian approach to immigration ethics. During the presidential terms of Evo Morales, Bolivia was conceived of as a plurinational state, meaning that unlike the colonial notion of “one people, one nation” that tends to obliterate pre-Columbian civilizations, Bolivia’s constitution acknowledges their existence and recognizes them as equal nations within the Bolivian state. This can be understood in terms of an openness to the Other, as Bolivia (as well as other nations such as Ecuador under Rafael Correa’s administration) took clear steps to create an inclusive Latin America where nature, Indigenous people, and mestizos would interact in a way that promotes life, especially the lives of the usually excluded.<sup>56</sup> This openness to the Other, in turn, extends to other countries, as they establish relationships based on solidarity and collaboration, which facilitates the achievement of *buen vivir*. This spirit of collaboration against poverty and exclusion was shared by the signatory countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America—People’s Trade Treaty (*Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América—Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos*, ALBA—TCP) signed in 2004 by so-called progressive governments. In a transmodern spirit, this treaty is based on princi-

ples of collaboration and mutual assistance aimed at eradicating economic and social inequities in search of the common good. Clearly, this idea is opposed to economic liberalism’s conception of human beings as competitors and nation-states as divided by an us-them logic, in which nations are obligated to protect their borders from strangers. A widespread tradition of accepting political exiles in Latin America, as explored in this chapter, is also evidence of a Dusselian, transmodernist approach to immigration ethics based on openness to the needs and experiences of Others on the global periphery.

### III. Conclusion

Our aim in this chapter has been to show that there is, indeed, a distinctive Latin American immigration ethics that philosophers, empirical scholars, and policy makers working on immigration issues can learn from and engage. Latin American and Latinx scholars have produced important works on the normative dimensions of exile, the unique experiences of oppression and resistance of Latin American migrants and their descendants in the United States, and the idea of “transmodernity,” which, we have argued, can be used to support a new system of immigration ethics. We have proposed that Latin American immigration ethics often responds to the particular histories of immigration/migration within and outside of Latin America, and to the ideas and conceptual frameworks generated by Latin American philosophers. Engaging this work can shift the course of our academic and policy-oriented discussions about migration by drawing attention to patterns and streams of migration that have gone underexplored, as well as the relevant strategies and proposals of Latin American scholars and migrants themselves.

### Notes

1. For a helpful overview of this literature, see Sarah Fine, “The Ethics of Immigration: Self-Determination and the Right to Exclude,” *Philosophy Compass* 8, no. 3 (March 2013): 254–68.
2. In his conception of Center and Periphery countries, Raúl Prebisch argues that while countries of the Center have fully retained the benefits of the technical progress of their industry, countries of the Periphery have transferred a part of the fruit their own technical progress to the Center; this has caused increasing economic and technological inequalities between the two poles. See “El Desarrollo económico de América Latina y algunos de sus principales problemas,” in



- La teoría social Latinoamericana: Textos escogidos*, ed. Rui Mauro Marini, vol. 1 (Mexico City: UNAM, 1994), 238.
3. Enrique Dussel, *1492: El encubrimiento del Otro* (La Paz: Plural editores, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la educación—UMSA, 1994).
  4. See Stephanie Wood, *Transcending Conquest: Nahuatl Views of Spanish Colonial Mexico* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003) and María Lugones, "Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System," *Hypatia* 22, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 186–219.
  5. Adela Pellegrino, "La migración internacional en América Latina y el Caribe: Tendencias y perfiles de los migrantes," *Serie Población y Desarrollo* 35 (March 2003): 11.
  6. Enrique de Gandia, "Sarmiento y su teoría de 'Civilización y Barbarie,'" *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 4, no. 1 (January 1962): 70. [que los negros y los indios eran elementos de atraso en la marcha de la civilización y se preguntaba si no había sido un error, durante la colonia, incorporar los indígenas a la vida de los españoles.]
  7. Carmen Norambuena, "La inmigración en el pensamiento de la intelectualidad Chilena 1810–1910," *Contribuciones Científicas y Tecnológicas* 109 (1995): 73–83.
  8. Carlos Beorlegui, *Historia del pensamiento filosófico Latinoamericano: Una búsqueda incesante de la identidad*, 3rd ed. (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 2010).
  9. Pellegrino, "Migración internacional," 11.
  10. Pellegrino, 15.
  11. Jorge Martínez and Daniela Vono, "Geografía migratoria intrarregional de América Latina y el Caribe al comienzo del siglo XXI," *Revista de Geografía Norte Grande* 34 (2005): 39–52.
  12. Martínez and Vono, "Geografía," 47.
  13. Stephen Castles, Hein de Hass, and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (New York: Guilford Press, 2014), 129.
  14. Reinhard Lohrmann, "Irregular Migration: A Rising Issue in Developing Countries," *International Migration* 25, no. 3 (September 1987): 258.
  15. Alicia Maguid, "The Importance of Systematizing Migration Information for Making Policy: Recent Initiatives and Possibilities for Latin America and the Caribbean," *OIM Sobre Migración Latinoamericana* 11, no. 3 (1993): 5–67.
  16. See Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 26.
  17. Sara Castro-Klarén, "Framing Pan-Americanism: Simón Bolívar's Findings," *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 32.
  18. Ana Margheritis, "Mercosur's Post-Neoliberal Approach to Migration: From Workers' Mobility to Regional Citizenship," in *A Liberal Tide? Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy in Latin America*, ed. David James Cantor, Luisa Feline

- Freier, and Jean-Pierre Gauci (London: School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2015), 57.
19. Mario Sznajder and Luis Roniger, "Political Exile in Latin America," *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no. 4 (July 2007): 7.
  20. Sznajder and Roniger, "Political Exile," 25n2.
  21. Here, we follow the analysis of Pereda's arguments offered in Amy Reed-Sandoval, "Immigrant or Exiled? Reconceiving the Displazada/os of Latin American and Latino Philosophy," *APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy*, 15, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 11–14.
  22. Carlos Pereda, *Lessons in Exile*, trans. Sean Manning (Leiden: Brill Rodopi, 2019), 40. See also Carlos Pereda, *Los aprendizajes del exilio* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, 2008).
  23. Silvana Rabinovich, "'Exilio domiciliario': Avatares de un destierro diferente," *Athenea Digital* 15, no. 4 (December 2015): 339. See also Silvana Rabinovich, "Al Ándalus en el exilio: Andanzas de moriscos y maranos," in *Mimesis e invisibilización social: Interdividualidad colectiva en América Latina*, ed. Carlos Mendoza Álvarez, José Luís Jobim, and Mariana Méndez-Gallardo (Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2017).
  24. Silvana Rabinovich, "De exilios y pandemia: Cavilaciones heterónomas," presented May 29, 2020 (online), to the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Autónoma de México. Accessible at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OcV2E4uU-WE>.
  25. An exception to this can be found in the work of Hannah Arendt.
  26. José Jorge Mendoza, "Latin Philosophy and the Ethics of Migration," in *Latin American and Latinx Philosophy: A Collaborative Introduction*, ed. Robert Eli Sanchez Jr. (New York: Routledge, 2020), 199.
  27. Anzaldúa's work has been critiqued by some feminist scholars working in Mexico on the grounds that it neglects the experiences of immigration enforcement south of the border and particularly in Mexico. See, for instance, Debra A. Castillo, *Border Women: Writing from La Frontera* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).
  28. Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1987), 3.
  29. Grant Silva, "On the Militarization of Borders and the Juridical Right to Exclude," *Public Affairs Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (April 2015): 223.
  30. Ernesto Rosen Velásquez, "States of Violence and the Right to Exclude," *Journal of Poverty* 21, no. 4 (2017): 311. For additional analysis of ways in which immigration enforcement has undermined U.S. Latina/o/xs in particular, see Eduardo Mendieta, "The U.S. Border and the Political Ontology of 'Assassination Nation': Thanatological Dispositifs," *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 31, no. 1 (2017): 82–100, and José Jorge Mendoza, "Doing Away with Juan Crow: Two Standards for Just Immigration Reform," *APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy* 15 no. 1 (Fall 2015): 14–20.

31. We borrow the term "visible Latina/o/x identity" from Linda Martín Alcoff. See also Amy Reed-Sandoval, *Socially Undocumented: Identity and Immigration Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).
32. Carlos Alberto Sanchez, "'Illegal' Immigrants: Law, Fantasy, and Guts," *Philosophy in the Contemporary World* 21, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 4.
33. Joseph Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 11.
34. Here, we follow closely José Jorge Mendoza's overview of Latinx contributions to the open borders debate, in "Latinx Philosophy and the Ethics of Immigration," in *Latin American and Latinx Philosophy: A Collaborative Introduction*, ed. Robert Eli Sanchez (New York, Routledge, 2019), 198–219.
35. See Jorge Valadez, "Immigration, Self-Determination, and Global Justice: Towards a Holistic Normative Theory of Migration," *Journal of International Political Theory* 8, nos. 1/2 (April 2012): 135–46.
36. See José-Antonio Oroscó, *Toppling the Melting Pot: Immigration and Multiculturalism in American Pragmatism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016).
37. Natalie Cisneros, "'Alien' Sexuality: Race, Maternity, and Citizenship," *Hypatia*, 28, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 209–306.
38. Mariana Ortega, *In-Between: Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), 3.
39. María Lugones, "Playfulness, 'World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception," *Hypatia* 2, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 3.
40. Lugones, "Playfulness," 17.
41. Ortega, *In-Between*, 194.
42. Ortega, 202.
43. Stephanie Rivera Berruz, "Latin American and Latinx Feminisms," in Sanchez Jr., *Latin American and Latinx Philosophy*, 175.
44. Cynthia M. Paccacercua et al., "In the Flesh and Word: Latina Feminist Philosophers' Collective Labor," *Hypatia* 31, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 437–46.
45. Note, however, that not all U.S. Latina/o/xs are, in fact, migrants. Still, the work of Latinx philosophy is relevant, as they are often treated as such in the United States and elsewhere.
46. Javier Sanjinés, "The Nation: An Imagined Community?" in *Globalization and the Decolonial Option*, ed. Walter Dignolo and Arturo Escobar (London: Routledge, 2010), 153.
47. S.v. "Philosophy of Liberation," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, by Eduardo Mendieta, January 28, 2016, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberation/>.
48. For more on this topic, see Horacio Cerutti Guldberg, *Filosofía de la liberación Latinoamericana*, 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992).
49. Enrique Dussel, *Ética de la liberación en la edad de la globalización y de la exclusión* (Madrid: Trotta, 1998). [el principio de la obligación de producir, reproducir y desarrollar la vida humana concreta de cada sujeto ético en comunidad. Este principio tiene pretensión de universalidad.]

50. Dussel, *Ética*, 215. [es la mediación formal o procedimental del principio ético material. Se trata de una norma universal para «aplicar» el contenido (con verdad práctica) como mediación para la producción, reproducción y desarrollo de la vida humana de cada sujeto ético del enunciado normativo.]
51. Dussel, 268. [determina al ámbito de lo que puede-hacerse dentro del horizonte a) de lo que esta éticamente permitido-hacerse, b) hasta lo que necesariamente debe-operarse.]
52. Aníbal Quijano, *Aníbal Quijano: Ensayos en torno a la colonialidad del poder* (n.p.: Ediciones del Siglo, 2019); also see Walter Dignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011).
53. Enrique Dussel, "World-System and 'Trans'-Modernity," trans. Alessandro Fornazzari, *Nepantla: Views from South* 3, no. 2 (2002): 224.
54. Linda Martín Alcoff, "Enrique Dussel's Transmodernism," *TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World* 1, no. 3 (2012): 63.
55. Enrique Dussel, "Transmodernidad e interculturalidad: Interpretación desde la filosofía de la liberación," *Erasmus: Revista para el Diálogo Intercultural* 5, nos. 1–2 (2003): 65. [tendrá una pluriversidad rica y será fruto de un auténtico diálogo intercultural, que debe tomar claramente en cuenta las asimetrías existentes.]
56. The creation and development of Bolivia's and Ecuador's constitutions was a highly complicated process, not exempt from difficulties and contradictions. For more on this topic, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *Refundación del estado en América Latina: Perspectivas desde una epistemología del Sur* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, 2010).