

"*Latin American Immigration Ethics* takes seriously the heterogeneity of experiences that makes up Latin American immigration and lends it philosophical dimension. A significant contribution to the literature, the essays included here are singularly unique. Required reading for anyone interested in this topic."

Carlos Alberto Sánchez, author of *A Sense of Brutality: Philosophy After Narco-Culture*

Latin American Immigration Ethics advances philosophical conversations and debates about immigration by theorizing migration from the Latin American and Latinx contexts. Without eschewing relevant conceptual resources derived from European and Anglo-American philosophies, the essays in this book emphasize Latin American and Latinx philosophies, decolonial and feminist theories, and Indigenous philosophies of Latin America in the pursuit of an immigration ethics. The contributors explore the moral challenges of immigration that either arise within Latin America, or when Latin Americans and Latina/o/xs migrate to and reside within the United States, addressing the lacuna of philosophical writing on migration, maternity, and childhood.

Contributors

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LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION ETHICS

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AMY REED-SANDOVAL AND
LUIS RUBÉN DÍAZ CEPEDA

 THE UNIVERSITY OF
ARIZONA PRESS

Tucson, Arizona 85721
www.uapress.arizona.edu



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Edited by
Amy Reed-Sandoval and
Luis Rubén Díaz Cepeda



THE UNIVERSITY OF
ARIZONA PRESS
TUCSON

The University of Arizona Press
www.uapress.arizona.edu

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ISBN-13: 978-0-8165-4273-4 (hardcover)
ISBN-13: 978-0-8165-4272-7 (paperback)

Cover design by Carrie House, HOUSEdesign LLC
Typeset by Sara Thaxton in 10/14 Warnock Pro (text), Termina, and Trade Gothic Next (display)

Publication of this book is made possible in part by support from the Dean's Office of the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and by the proceeds of a permanent endowment created with the assistance of a Challenge Grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, a federal agency.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Reed-Sandoval, Amy, editor. | Díaz Cepeda, Luis Rubén, 1976– editor.
Title: Latin American immigration ethics / edited by Amy Reed-Sandoval and Luis Rubén Díaz Cepeda.
Description: Tucson : University of Arizona Press, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021014314 | ISBN 9780816542734 (hardcover) | ISBN 9780816542727 (paperback)
Subjects: LCSH: Emigration and immigration—Philosophy. | Philosophy, Latin American.
Classification: LCC JV6035 .L37 2021 | DDC 170.98—dc23
LC record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2021014314>

Printed in the United States of America
© This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

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LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION ETHICS

PART III

Mexico and Central America

CHAPTER 7

Ethics of Liberation

Listening to Central American Migrants' Response to Forced Migration

LUIS RUBÉN DÍAZ CEPEDA

Migration of Central Americans to the United States is not new. In fact, mass migration from the region has occurred since at least the 1970s, originating in a mixture of local corruption and imposed capitalism that has caused economic vulnerability, civil war, and genocide. Indeed, forced migration has been, at least in part, caused by colonial structures and the enactment and legitimization of neoliberal economic policies that only look to increase the profit of the few without any esteem for most people's lives. This disregard for the lives of the poor is unequivocally directed specially toward the racialized and sexed/gendered bodies of indigenous people and dark-skinned mestizos.

In this chapter, I argue that migrants suffer the consequences of colonial structures as reflected in internal colonialism, in which diminishing social and economic structures place them in a disadvantaged position, instantiated in discriminatory social practices and manifested in xenophobia and aporophobia. Clearly these practices are immoral and detrimental to a population's well-being and thus need to be challenged. The research I present here reveals that migrants themselves are already doing so by creating solidarity networks, showing their high levels of agency and resilience. These solidarity networks are amplified by pro-migrant social activists and organization that assist them with shelter, lobbying, and defense services.

In support of my argument, I first explore sociological explanations of poverty in Latin America, referring more specifically to Pablo González Casanova's theory of sociology of exploitation, namely its concept of social relation of exploitation, for its broad explanatory power. I then show how exploitation is instantiated in the migration flows from Central America to Mexico and the United States. The third and final section is normative. Here, based on Dussel's ethics of liberation, I argue that meeting the ethical duty to answer to the Other is a clear and useful answer to discriminatory practices. I conclude by illustrating how migrants help each other and how this effort is supported by social organizations.

I. Theorizing the Causes of Poverty

The conquest of Abya Yala by Europe and its consequent transformation into what is now known as Latin America marked the beginning of a new era. For the first time, the entire world was connected. This juncture was brutal, as in the process the native peoples of America were denied human dignity and identity.¹ This disdain for native Americans had the disastrous consequences of decimating them and forcing most of the survivors into a position of serfdom through a social and economic system designed to keep them under the control of the colonial powers. Even after the achievement of independence, these colonial structures continue to exist through internal colonialism, which systematically leaves out a large segment of the population not considered worthy of a better life by the political and economic elites. This discrimination is based on race and gender, wherein the further a person is from a European likeness, the more they are discriminated against. As I will show in this section, colonial structures are not only instantiated in macro frames of reference—they are reflected in social relations of exploitation and domination.

After the independence wars in the first decades of the 1800s, Latin American countries gained their political independence from Spain and Portugal. Yet, over the following century, they remained socially and economically dependent upon Europe, as the local elites continued abusing their colonial privileges and looking at Europe as superior. As a result, indigenous and dark mestizos lived in deplorable conditions, which led to several civil wars in the search of social justice in the 1900s. The outcome of these conflicts were, in some cases, military dictatorships and, in others, a civil government.

After World War II and in the context of the Cold War, Latin America increased its industrialization and urbanization. The decades of the 1950s and 1960s saw political change in Latin America, during which some of the most prominent philosophical theories from the region were developed. These include the theology of liberation, philosophy of liberation, and dependence theory. It was at this time that a new generation of thinkers, which included philosophers, sociologists, and economists, attempted to understand Latin America's poor social and economic condition. Far from homogeneous, these efforts led to the emergence of at least two different and opposing positions: modernization theories and dependence theory.

On the one hand, the theories of modernization argued that poverty in Latin America was due to its lack of an urban middle class. In Roitman's words, "Its difference lies in highlighting the landowning oligarchy as the cause of the backwardness and therefore a rural society whose social structure is characterized by the low level of social mobility and elective rationality."² According to this position, once an urban middle class was developed, there would be a state with enough legitimacy to enforce the rule of law and remove power from the former oligarchy. In the process, the urban middle class will modernize the industry and the countryside. In short, the path to follow is the one set forth by the United States and Canada. Once Latin American countries reached the same level of modernization and democracy as their northern neighbors, they would also reach the same level of development.³

As it became clear that modernization theories offered neither a sound explanation nor a path to end or at least lessen poverty, a novel approach closer to Latin America's circumstances emerged: critical sociology. This latter claims that social scientists should not remain strangers to their realities but, on the contrary, should actively work to assist the poor. Further, they must attempt to understand the reality and inner lives of individuals. As Mill writes, "The sociological imagination allows us to capture the history and the relationship between the two within society."⁴ Critiques of modernization theories continued, resulting in the development by the 1970s of dependency theory by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, among others. They argue that "the social and political structure change as different classes and social groups manage to impose their interests, their strengths and their command on the whole of society."⁵ In other words, from the point of view of dependency theory, economic inequalities between the industrialized countries and so-called underdeveloped countries were due not

to distinct technological progress but to class struggle. These theorists also argued that the economic system was set up in such a way that Latin America would always be dependent upon the countries of the "Center" (especially the United States) as long as the region continued to import out-of-date technology and export labor and raw material.

While these theories have certainly influenced not only the theoretical development of Latin America but also its political and economic circumstances, I posit that in the case under consideration, which is the current situation of Central American migrants in Mexico, Pablo González Casanova's theory is more apropos, as his sociology of exploitation offers a broader explanatory power. Specifically, González explains that colonial domination implies an unfair appropriation of resources from the colonized country. In a colonial relationship, the dominant country monopolizes the resources of the colonized, blocking other countries from trading with them. Clearly, even in the circumstances of economic liberalism, this action deprives colonies from looking to other partners for better deals. At the same time, colonies are forced to serve as a supplier of the natural resources to the metropolis. In consequence, their industrialization has slowed down to the rhythm that is convenient for the colonizers. Finally, the same mechanism of control over natural resources is used to obtain cheap labor. Unfortunately, these conditions did not disappear with the end of the colonial period; instead, they continued to persist in the form of internal colonialism.

B. Internal Colonialism

The colonial period in Latin America was characterized by a hierarchical system, with Spaniards in the highest position. The *encomienda* system provided *encomenderos* with free labor. As the indigenous people's physical constitution was not fit to work in the mines, people from Africa were kidnapped and forced into slave work in the extraction of resources. Both black slaves and indigenous people received no payment and were given barely enough food to survive. It is of significance to note that not all native people suffered in equal measures, as some made alliances with the colonial powers and thus held privileges over other natives. Those privileges never matched those of native Spaniards or Spaniards' descendants, yet were fundamental to spread and sustain the structures of domination by naturalizing them in the form of social relations.

Relevant to my argument, González points out that colonial structures do not disappear with political independence but quite often remain in the form of *internal colonialism*, defined as "a structure of social relations of domination and exploitation between heterogeneous cultural groups."⁶ González elaborates that the exact form internal colonialism takes emerges from the colonial structure left when a country gains political independence. In the *plural society*, for example, one ruling class is substituted by another (Spaniards, Creoles, and white mestizos); at the same time, there is no substantial change in the deplorable conditions in which indigenous and darker mestizo people live. In the case of Latin America, the self-entitled elite have ruled our countries without a real democracy. Another manifestation of the persistence of colonial structures is *marginalism*, the phenomenon of underdevelopment, wherein the ruling elite excludes a large part of the population from political, economic, and social development processes.⁷

In furthering his project of developing a sociology of exploitation, González argues that "asymmetry is linked to the idea of power and dominance; it is indirectly analyzed as predominance or dependency, as monopolization of the economy, power, culture of one nation by another; or directly as an economic, political and psychological influence that men or nations with power, wealth, prestige exercise over those who lack them or have them to a lesser degree."⁸ This postulation signified a major development in the analysis of the reasons for poverty in Latin America, for it includes not only the social and economic structures that cause systemic poverty in people of color but also the social relations of exploitation between rulers and citizens, elites and peasants, and so forth. Quijano explains that "internal colonialism corresponds to a structure of social relations of domination and exploitation between heterogeneous cultural groups," wherein the powerful use the higher social and economic positions they took over from the former colonial powers to keep colonized groups subjugated under the same social dynamic as prior to independence.⁹

These colonialist structures are instantiated in the way individuals make themselves present in the world; this is to say in their personalities. Furthering this point, González points out that one of the most relevant features of a colonialist personality is the complicated web of attitudes toward other people according to the place individuals are ascribed on the social scale. Even as internal colonialists may be servile to people higher than themselves in the social hierarchy, they dehumanize the colonized. To the colonialist, the colonized can be ignored, humiliated, or, even worse, killed, as the latter are

perceived as “things” at the disposition of the former.¹⁰ Clearly, migrants are among those most affected by these colonial structures, as they are forced to leave their countries because they cannot find the material conditions necessary to support their lives.

To summarize, Latin American countries suffer from among the highest levels of economic inequity in the world, as evidenced by both external differences as compared to the United States and Canada as well as by internal inequalities when the income of the lowest to the highest economic decile is compared. Modernization theories have explained this phenomenon as a failure of Latin American countries to follow the same path of the United States—the development of a middle urban class able to bring democracy and modernize industry. Counter to this explanation, dependency theory maintains that economic inequalities are due to class struggles and an unfavorable trade relationship with the industrialized countries. While both theories were popular in their time and to some extent remain valid, I prefer González’s sociology of exploitation, as it considers the social and economic conditions together with social relations to explain the endemic oppression of people of color. I argue that this colonial structure and social relation of exploitation creates a large group that has no access to material resources and suffers discrimination on a regular basis, which forces them to leave their countries. They embark first to other countries in Latin America, then to the United States and, in fewer numbers, to Canada. In the following section, I present a brief description of how these processes manifest themselves in the lives of Central American immigrants on Mexico’s territory.

II. Central American Immigrants in Mexico

Contrary to widely held belief, the migration of Central Americans to the United States is not a new phenomenon but has occurred since the 1970s. According to Jonas and Rodríguez, the origins of this migration can be traced to a mixture of civil war, genocide, violence, radical capitalism, and economic vulnerability.¹¹ It has been, at least in part, caused by the implementation and legitimization of neoliberal and globalization policies that deny ways of life and survival that diverge from those required by the market, which privileges individualization over the collective. These policies have created a surplus population, which tends to be seen as inferior by the dominant powers.¹²

This disregard for the lives of the victims of the system can be seen in both overt and covert forms of discrimination against migrants from the Global South. Within this broader context, I proceed to expose the particularities of the Central American migrants’ stay and transit through Mexico on their way north.

A. Southern Border

Connections between Mexico and Central America trace back to colonial times, during which both belonged to the Spanish Empire. The borders between Guatemala and Belize in Central America and the states of Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, and Quintana Roo in Mexico were established in 1882, after several wars and territorial disputes. Within this context, Mexico and Guatemala share nearly 80 percent of the total borderline. Historically speaking, Chiapas is the Mexican state with the most connections to Guatemala, followed by Tabasco. While there were national differences, it is possible to argue that at a local level there was a relatively high trade connection, usually beneficial to Mexico.¹³

Manuel Ángel Castillo and Mónica Toussaint document three large immigration waves from Central America to Mexico after the achievement of independence.¹⁴ The first one was seasonal and dates to the turn of the twentieth century, when farmworkers from Guatemala migrated to work on coffee plantations in the zone known as the Soconusco in Chiapas. This workforce was not only welcomed but also promoted by the coffee plantations’ owners, who actively sought cheap labor. Most immigrants were young adults with little to no formal education; they were not perceived as outsiders, as they played a vital role in the economy and did not create social antagonism. As time progressed, this migration movement diversified, and immigrants began to work in other areas, such as construction and domestic services in the cities.

A second immigration wave resulted from the armed conflict in Central America from 1981 to 1983. Fleeing from this turmoil, thousands of farmworkers found refuge in Mexico, mostly in Chiapas, with a smaller number relocating to the states of Campeche and Quintana Roo. Even though Mexico was not a signatory country of the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, it provided asylum to immigrants from the region.¹⁵ By the decade of the 1990s, the “Mexican government’s implementation of the Program of Migratory Stabilization led to the progressive,

definite settlement of those who had decided to stay in Mexican territory, nearly one third of the total 'recognized refugee population.'"¹⁶

The third immigration wave is ongoing and consists of in-transit migrants whose goal is not to stay in Mexico but to continue their way to the United States. For the most part, this migration comprises young adult males, but it also includes some women and unaccompanied children. I elaborate on this type of migration in the following section. For now, it is enough to add that in addition to the aforementioned stabilization program, the Mexican government has passed new laws protecting the rights of people beyond their citizenship. For example, the Immigration Law passed in 2011 (but implemented in 2013) holds, among other things, the principles of "recognition of the acquired rights of migrants and equity between nationals and foreigners."¹⁷ The legislation then attempts to protect migrants regardless of their legal status, giving precedence to their human rights before their legal status. In that sense, it is important to note that since the creation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), human rights have been a powerful tool to better the migrants' material conditions, as they have prompted the promulgation of laws to protect persons regardless of their immigration status.¹⁸

The combination of former seasonal migrants, refugees, and in-transit migrants who decide to stay in Mexico has created a transnational population with connections on both sides of the border. It is only fair to say that this immigrant population receives fairly decent treatment on the part of the government in Mexico, as they have access to education, medical services, and family reunification and can present complaints against wrongful behavior on the part of government authorities. At the same time, it is vital to not forget that this treatment is still contingent on national security concerns and economic conditions.¹⁹ In that sense, difficulties arise when nondocumented migrants reach legal adulthood (eighteen years old in Mexico), at which point they cannot acquire full legal rights. As a direct consequence, they have no access to a college education and/or better jobs. Clearly these disadvantages condemn them to a low social and economic status, which leaves them vulnerable to discriminatory attacks from others. Women and children are especially vulnerable to such assaults.

To elaborate upon the harmful circumstances that women face because of migration, it is important to recognize the reality, which is that they often

succumb to these conditions. If a woman decides not to migrate, she is often left with domestic responsibilities, especially that of childcare. Usually this means that she cannot pursue a professional career of her own and consequently becomes dependent upon the ability and willingness of her partner or relatives to support her and their family. Clearly this violates her own personal aspirations and may force her to endure abusive behavior. On the other hand, if women do decide to migrate, they risk facing harsher traveling conditions than men do, including the possibility of sexual harassment and abuse. As one migrant named Helena shared, "When I cross the border, I try to do it during my menstrual period, so they do not rape me."²⁰ These conditions do not end upon the completion of travels. Rather, they are a permanent menace that persists when migrant women become settled in their destination. As Lindsey Carter writes, "Immigrant women are blocked, delayed, and discouraged from accessing their rights to legal identity, health care, and regularization of their immigration status, not because of restrictive laws, but as a result of negative and confusing institutional interactions with low-to-mid level officials."²¹ Unlike openly restrictive laws, these harassing behaviors are subtler and hard to detect, as they have been normalized in the form of abusive social relations. Moreover, in those instances where they are detected and denounced, they are rarely prosecuted.

In sum, similar to other migration patterns in South America, seasonal migrant workers first went from the Guatemalan countryside to the coffee plantations in the rural areas of Mexico. From there, some moved to the cities, creating networks and a transnational community, which served as a supporting social network as they adjust to living in Mexico. Immigrants living in Mexico receive degrees of government protection as their children have access to education, medical services, family reunification, and legal personality. To acknowledge this fairly good treatment is not to ignore that it is still subordinated to issues of national security. Beyond government treatment, it is possible to observe that most discriminatory practices come at a micro level, from either the general population or government officers (acting on their own will, not under government directives). These discriminatory social practices affect mostly, but not exclusively, women and children. Further, these trying conditions are an example of how immigrants are tolerated in as far as they are functional to the system and are used to support the privileges of the few.

B. Transit to the United States

Historically, for the most part, Central American migration has occurred across the Texas borderline between the United States and Mexico. Some immigrants have sought to enter the United States clandestinely, while others have turned themselves in to immigration authorities for the purpose of seeking political asylum. The number and demographic composition of this migratory flow was stable for a long time. However, at the end of 2013, a notable increase occurred, reaching its climax in the summer of 2014. Since then, there has been an oscillation in the numbers of migrants. The composition of this migratory flow also changed, with an increase in the number of unaccompanied minors as well as family groups (mainly women with children), who turned themselves in to be arrested by immigration officials to later request political asylum.

It should be noted that at the same time there was an increase in Central American migrants, there was a decrease in the number of Mexicans seeking to enter the United States in an unauthorized manner. Consequently, the overall balance of migrants seeking to enter the United States illegally has in fact declined to levels unseen since the 1970s. Josiah Heyman, Jeremy Slack, and Emily Guerra question why, despite this decline in actual migration flow, border surveillance has not only not decreased but in fact has increased. They conclude that “recent empirical evidence has linked these contending discourses about borders and immigration to niche right-wing media, and to the election of Donald Trump,” fostering hate speech and rejection of the Other on the part of American citizens toward marginalized groups, including immigrants.²²

C. The Emergence of the Caravans

Seeking to protect themselves from the predatory practices of criminal organizations and in the hope that the U.S. government will grant them political asylum if they show in numbers, some migrants decide to complete the journey from Mexico's southern border to the United States in large groups. This change in the form of the migratory flow first manifested itself dramatically on October 12, 2018.

Historically, migrants seeking to reach the United States traveled in isolation or in small groups. However, on that date, a message on Facebook led

to the departure of three hundred people from San Pedro Sula, Honduras. The originating Facebook page had only two hundred members. The message read, “Every day 300 people leave Honduras, we better make a caravan, as a single family, to take fewer risks to the north,” which at first did not have much impact. However, its dissemination by the local HSH television station—ironically, as a criticism of the caravan's endeavor—allowed the message to reach a much wider audience, inspiring approximately three thousand people to join the group within a few days.²³ In less than two weeks, the caravan had grown to around seven thousand people, who arrived at the border bridge between Guatemala and Mexico on October 19, 2018.

The immigration authorities of Mexico did not prevent the entry of this first caravan to Mexico, although they did not help in an organized way. One of the causes of this lack of attention was the transition of federal government administrations. The outgoing administration, headed by Enrique Peña Nieto, initiated a weak response with the “You Are at Home” (*Estas en tu casa*) program. At the same time, the elected administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, which was not yet in office, also did not take control of the situation. Since then, it has been religious organizations and human rights organizations that have put pressure on the state to safeguard the best interests of migrants, especially infants and women. The relative ease and support that this first caravan had in entering Mexico, as well as the migrants' minimal exposure to attacks and extortion, inspired other people to do the same. Consequently, several more caravans were organized to the United States, only to find the most obstacles at precisely the end of their journey.

The transit from Mexico to the north was not what the immigrants expected. Far from their expectations of finding a relatively easy entry to the United States, they encountered adverse circumstances. Due to the Trump administration's harsh immigration policies, immigrants who did manage to reach U.S. territory and request political asylum were sent to detention centers to wait for a migration judge to hear their case. This waiting period can take years and has involved the separation of families, including the removal of infants and toddlers from their parents.

Unfortunately, being in these detention centers under the Trump administration was not the direst situation that an immigrant could face, since, as immigration policies hardened, they were not even allowed to apply for political asylum in U.S. territory. In their article “Blockading Asylum Seekers at Ports of Entry at the US-Mexico Border Puts Them at Increased Risk of

Exploitation, Violence, and Death,"²⁴ Heyman and Slack documented that the U.S. government had implemented various strategies to deny immigrants access to the asylum system:

US border officials have refused to allow many asylum seekers who are subject to expedited removal to pursue asylum claims, even when they request asylum or express a fear of return. The [Trump] administration has criminally prosecuted and detained asylum-seekers in order to deter others from coming. It has separated children from parents at the border, and it now proposes to reunify these families, albeit in detention facilities. It has even raised the possibility of declaring Mexico a "safe" third country, thus barring asylum claims from migrants that first pass through Mexico.²⁵

More than this, as of February 2019, the Trump administration began to promote more subtle and aggressive strategies to limit immigration. One of these was to prevent immigrants from even reaching the ports of entry at the immigration checkpoints. This was accomplished by posting immigration officers on the international bridges that connect Mexico and the United States. These officials were then tasked to question people, especially colored immigrants, before they enter U.S. territory about their immigration status. If they could not prove a legal immigration status, they were not allowed to proceed further to the established checkpoint.

Facing this situation, migrants were soon no longer attempting to enter the United States via caravans, reverting to the practices of crossing through nonauthorized ports by themselves or in small groups. However, the stiffening of border security forced them to go through more distant and more dangerous paths. In Ivan's words, "I am going through this place that I know, where there is no fence. Now [May] is a good time to do it, for I cannot carry too much food. However, because of the rain season, there is water. I already know the route."²⁶ In addition to the dangers inherent in going through the desert, unauthorized access to the United States is now considered a felony by the United States justice system. Formally speaking, this criminalizes migrants, which in turn will make it difficult for them to establish their case before an immigration court, as they would already have criminal records. A third alternative that migrants have chosen is to remain in Mexico waiting to be called to apply for political asylum, which can take several months or even years. Obviously, rejection at the ports of entry and forced settlement in the

border cities of northern Mexico puts migrants at risk of being kidnapped and forcibly put to work by drug cartels, whether as marijuana farmers or cocaine producers, hit men, or prostitutes. Clearly, the policy subjects them to the very risks from which they fled in the first place.

On January 20, 2021, Joe Biden was sworn in as the forty-sixth president of the United States. The first hundred days of his administration brought some favorable changes for immigrants, yet, as of this writing, serious challenges remained. The improvements include the reactivation of the Temporary Protected Status program to the benefit of certain national groups, the narrowing of immigration enforcement in the interior of the United States (including the removal of the public charge rule and the focus, in enforcement, on those noncitizens who represent a national security risk), the end of the Muslim and African travel ban, the freezing of regulatory fees and excessive bureaucratic and sometimes duplicated procedures, and an increase in the budget for the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. These changes taken together mean that immigrants who are already in the country have a fair and human path to gain legal status. However, the situation south of the border line has not improved that significantly.

The enumerated changes are necessary but not sufficient to properly respond to the migration situation on the border with Mexico. It remains, for example, to increase the refugee ceiling. In his platform statement "Reassert America's Commitment to Asylum-Seekers and Refugees," President Biden pledged to start with a ceiling of one hundred twenty-five thousand refugees, a number he promised to increase during his administration.²⁷ Yet, on February 12, 2021, the Department of State declared that Biden would propose a ceiling of 62,500 refugees for the fiscal year 2021. This number further decreased and has remained around fifteen thousand, allegedly because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the previous changes made by the Trump administration. Biden's administration resettled only 647 refugees during its first two months, and if it continues at this rate this will most likely mean a resettlement number lower than during any fiscal year under the Trump administration.²⁸ A second improvement that has yet to materialize is the end of family detention: while long-term detention has come to an end and short-term detention centers are slated to become processing centers, as of May 2021 these latter were still operating.

Most importantly, while it is true that, officially, unaccompanied children and asylum seekers with an open case are now allowed into the United States

to apply for asylum, the fact is that the U.S. government is not prepared to let them do so. Consequently, some migrants must still wait for their hearing in Mexico, alongside Central American migrants whose cases were denied. According to Ana Laura Ramírez-Vázquez, a feminist activist living in Ciudad Juárez who focuses on issues relating to children and adolescents, children who remain in Mexico do not find an integral process that may channel them to a better life, causing a best-case scenario in which they may receive secondary education and get a low-paying job that makes them victims of capitalism.²⁹ In the worst-case scenario, migrants can be killed or kidnaped by criminal groups. In short, some of the problems that migrants faced during the Trump era are still apparent and very real under the Biden administration.

Throughout, Mexican social and religious organizations have played a vital role in protecting the immigrants' lives, beginning with providing safe shelters. Immigrants' houses such as El Buen Pastor (The Good Shepherd), la Divina misericordia (The divine mercy) at the southern border, or La Casa del Migrante (Migrants' house) and Annunciation House at the northern border offer places where migrants can stay and rest. In the case of the southern border, migrants tend to stay in the shelters for only a few days, to get some rest, wash their clothes, and heal their injuries. As soon as they are ready, they resume their journey to the north. In the case of the north, migrants stay for longer periods, with some waiting for hearings in the U.S. courts of their asylum claims. In either case, shelters serve as a safe place, as there is a tacit agreement by migratory authorities to not conduct any raids in shelter facilities or their vicinities. They also serve as an intermediary between Mexican authorities and immigrants seeking to obtain a humanitarian visa, by providing evidence that the claimant is injured.

I argue, then, that as capital is no longer restricted by state limits, "the relation Center-periphery is becoming a social relation, instead of a geographical relation."³⁰ As in the case of Central American migrants, these social relations can be of exploitation and discrimination. This mistreatment commences at their place of origin, where they do not make enough money to survive or are direct victims of gang-related violence. This is an important distinction, for it points out that they are not necessarily being pulled by the "American Dream" but, rather, are pushed out of their homes by the hostile colonial conditions they live in. In this exodus from Central America, some migrants opt for staying in the southern borderlands, as they can keep

some level of contact with their relatives. Others decide to continue traveling to the north. Once they reach the Mexico-U.S. border, some turn themselves over to immigration officials in the hopes of gaining political asylum. However, this process became increasingly difficult because of the Trump administration's cruel and challenging policies, which continue to reverberate under Biden's tenure. Consequently, some migrants have decided to stay in Mexico, where they may continue to suffer the same discrimination from which they were fleeing.

It is important to notice that migrants are not passive subjects. On the contrary, as Jaime Rivas argues, immigrants are active participants who receive and interpret information and design strategies in their relationships with various local actors, as well as with external institutions and their staff.³¹ In the following section, then, I analyze the factors and ethics that keep them going despite the harsh conditions of the exodus. In doing so, I demonstrate that migrants show agency and solidarity to create solidarity networks among themselves, even as they receive the support of pro-immigrant social organizations and activists. This solidarity is exemplary of the ethical duty proposed by both Emmanuel Levinas and Enrique Dussel.

III. Solidarity

I begin this section with the idea that the modern notion of the nation-state was built from the dichotomy of a "we-they," a friend or an enemy.³² I maintain that, within a close community, people with shared identity help those inside of what I call their fraternal circle; that is to say people who are part of the same. As I will show, unlike this "we-they" system based on fraternal relationships within the imaginary community, some people go beyond their fraternal circle to engage in a relationship of solidarity with the Other, who by his mere presence questions the I. This questioning awakens a subjectivity in the I, wherein his duty toward the Other is recognized and fulfilled. This is because the I carries a preontological duty to the Other, which is an intrinsic part of the subjectivity of the individual. Let me delve into this process of the genesis of a political subjectivity.

In his conversation with Philippe Nemo, Levinas reassures his interlocutor that the responsibility toward the Other is addressed by the I as a face, as the exteriority.³³ The I is full when it responds to the calling of the Other,

since its own subjectivity is already occupied by its responsibility before the stranger. Responsibility is not an option for the I. However, this does not mean a condemnation. On the contrary, in the ethical encounter with the Other,³⁴ the I finds its freedom, because “freedom is in charge of the responsibility that it cannot assume, an elevation and an inspiration without complacency.”³⁵ This responsibility is there because the nature of the good is prior to being and has chosen the I to receive the command of the Other in which to respond. The very pronoun *I* means “Here I am” for you, in the voice of the I that answers the claim of the other without asking for anything in return.

When assumed, this responsibility translates into an obsession, which Levinas’s philosophy does not shy away from. On the contrary, he embraces the idea, because an obsessed person is not capable of indifference to the Other. In Levinas’s words, “This obsession with the other translates not to who should be blamed but to the question ‘What should I do?’”³⁶ It is important not to lose sight of the fact that this obsession with the Other is not the voluntary act of an isolated individual; rather, in the ethical act of taking the place of the Other, the I grows in freedom, because by recognizing the command of the Other, the I is. Responsibility toward the Other is a responsibility that does not obey the acts of the I; it is a responsibility that is not imposed but is made to be invited. In the words of Levinas, “It is on this figure of being that is possessed in the equality, about being *ápX’n* where the obsession that we have recognized in the proximity bursts.” In other words, this obsession does not require that the I already has a relationship with the Other; rather, it is awakened by the very presence of the Other, especially that of the widow, the orphan, and the stranger.

This responsibility for the Other, impelled by the presence of the Other in the subjectivity of the I, prevents the I’s consciousness from completing itself. For Levinas, “subjectivity is defined by the responsibility of others and not by being.”³⁷ That is, subjectivity is not the identity of the self to itself, but its responsibility for the other. This responsibility comes as a presence that overflows, a presence that does not allow consciousness to identify with itself. For Levinas then, the I must respond to the face of the Other, the stranger. This is the source of solidarity when migrants have nothing material to give away, as they are in challenging conditions, yet still are there for others, including strangers, with whom they cross paths.

This solidarity is beyond the line of duty marked by liberalism and its preference for selfish individual interest, as immigrants help each other, even

though this means risking their own well-being. In the course of research for this work, many instances of solidarity were encountered.³⁸ During field research on the border line between Tabasco, Mexico, and Guatemala, we waited by the railroads of the Beast (La Bestia), which is the train that Central American migrants board at Mexico’s southern border to get to Mexico City. From there, they look for other routes and ways to get to the northern border. They do so illegally, under a considerable risk of being captured by Mexican authorities or criminal group. At the railroad, we witnessed firsthand as migrants who had just met on their trip in the Beast were waiting for one of them (whom, for privacy reasons, I will call Pablo) to heal from a wounded ankle, an injury caused by jumping from the train to avoid a checkpoint set up by Mexico’s Migration National Institute. They told us, “No, we are not going to leave this dude here, we met him a few days ago, we came together on the train, in the Beast, we were doing good, but we saw a checkpoint, and we jumped. It was his turn, bad luck, we were doing good, f . . . k. But it is what it is, how are we going to leave him alone? No, we wait. We all are together.”³⁹

As we continued the research, it was possible to establish that behavior like this was not the exception but the rule among most migrants. It is important to highlight that opposite to *quid pro quo* practices—for example, in exchange-sex where women accept to have sexual intercourse with a male who protects them through the trip up north—in most cases the answer to the Other was not conditional on immigrants having something to give back. Again, they all were traveling with extremely scarce resources. Yet they shared the little they had, even if this little were to keep Pablo company even when doing so meant losing time and precious resources.

This sense of solidarity was manifested not only by immigrants but also by people who were moved by a feeling of solidarity to go meet people beyond their immediate circle to help the Other. I refer here to social activists and their organizations whom we encountered assisting migrants both in their journey and at the border.

A. Social Organizations

Using Levinas’s philosophy as a starting point, Enrique Dussel developed a conception of how an ethical subjectivity is present in the world from both a political and an ethical perspective. Dussel writes that “the ‘being-subject’

is a way of being aware or awake, that the birth of subjectivity (and embodiment) is placed in a position in which events appear phenomenally.⁴⁰ In other words, being is having a body, but more importantly, being aware of the world and the exploitation relations that exist in it. True subjectivity, which necessarily occurs within a community, occurs just as in Levinas, when the I is at the service of the Other. However, moving beyond Levinas's ideas, Dussel maintains that personal action is not enough; solidarity with the Other must be offered in a collective, organized, and institutional way.

The first step, then, to create a legitimate social organization is critical awareness. Undeniably, many groups of people never rebel against oppression. However, there is also the case of those who, while they do not directly suffer oppression, unite in solidarity with the victims and fight alongside them. It is possible then to affirm that only certain groups of people go "from non-conscience . . . to critical ethical conscience."⁴¹ Since the condition of being oppressed is not a sufficient or necessary reason for the emergence of a social organization, the question arises, "Where is the spark that starts them?" Based on Dussel's philosophy, I propose that the answer lies in the consciousness of oppression, not in oppression itself, since once people realize that oppressive conditions are not natural but are a consequence of human actions, they begin to fight them together.

Contrary to the liberal conception of men who take the individual as an independent being in constant war with other individuals for control of resources, ethical social organizations arise when there is a sense of community, when a "we" and not an "I" is created. To take this step from I to us, it is vital to recognize that human beings are not isolated but are always part of a community. The community begins to establish itself when a person goes from being just a person to being a political actor and understands politics as the creation of conditions in which all people can have a dignified life. This political actor comes from experiencing oppression firsthand, but also from the presence of the Other. From this, he begins to search for answers to his questions and makes the suffering of the Other his own and offers himself in substitution of the Other.

This step is taken when, in addition to the political community in which a person is born, there are strong ties that go beyond the limits of fraternity to become bonds of solidarity. As Dussel argues, "We are born into a political community . . . however, from a political point of view, this remains an abstraction that lacks the contradictions that always run through a commu-

nity . . . we move from the political community to the people."⁴² This movement occurs due to the mutual recognition of the oppressive condition of life of the victims of capitalism. When people are united in their grief and anger, they will fight together to overthrow the status quo that denies their right to *buen vivir*. For the fight to be successful, it is necessary to strengthen the bonds of co-responsibility and solidarity between the victims and the people who have come to their call for aid.

As I have already established, the link that unites these groups is solidarity defined as "critical emotionality directed at the suffering externality of the victim . . . [Solidarity] is, [then] the metaphysical desire of the Other as another."⁴³ In other words, while fraternity is a feeling that is promoted within a closed political community, solidarity seeks to alleviate the pain of the Other as Other, allowing the I to shed the restrictions imposed by a state in order to assist the Other wherever he is. In fact, the ethical I does not wait for the Other to appear but is eager to meet him. It is important to reaffirm that solidarity is not limited to the territory of a state or a political community but extends to the communion between the victim and the I, which not only responds to the questioning of the Other that is presented to it but also actively seeks to be close to the victim. By doing so, the I leaves the privileges that come with membership in the oppressive system and fights alongside the Other.

Clearly, if a person is not close to the Other, he will hardly develop a sense of ethical duty toward him. At first, it is an action in which the I searches the Other for the origin of the relationship between signified and signifier, but later it becomes a living relationship in which the I is exposed to the suffering of the Other. In other words, for the individual to perform her ethical duty, it is necessary to shorten the distance between them. As Dussel says, "shortening the distance is a praxis, it is acting towards the other [while Other], it is an action directed towards the neighborhood, the praxis is this and nothing else: a proximity approach."⁴⁴ To feel the pain of the Other, the I must leave the ivory tower and see the suffering of others face-to-face.

This movement is a conscious act of the I that goes beyond its borders, because it recognizes the suffering of the Other and therefore rushes to alleviate it: "Proximity is [then] the word that best expresses the essence of people, their first (archaeological) and final (eschatological) incarnation, an experience whose memory mobilizes people and their most ambitious and highly-minded projects."⁴⁵ It is important to note that proximity is not

limited to physical focus, as people may be physically close to each other but may not be emotionally close. That is, despite being physically close, they may lack the sense of solidarity with others that occurs when they recognize themselves in the suffering of others. In Dussel's words, "This closeness to things, this physical proximity is proxemic (people to being), not proximity (person to person)."⁴⁶ This means that physical proximity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to establish the relationship of solidarity between the oppressed and the one who has recognized the alleviation of their unpleasant condition as an ethical duty.

This proxemic proximity movement, that is, the passage from just being physically near to actually establishing a relationship with the Other, is carried out by both migrants and social activists who live in solidarity with the oppressed, either because they are part of them or because they fight alongside the Other. An ethical person loses his innocence and realizes that it is he who is in the prison of totalization and not the Other, because the Other, despite the oppressive social conditions, is already free in its alterity. Both the ethical I and the Other fight a system that has led individuals to view exploitation as natural and to place blame on an impersonal economic system instead of on the people who promote it. A fair person is then one who recognizes that "ethical conscience [is] defined as the capacity of one to listen to the voice of the other, the trans-ontological word that springs beyond the current system to respond to the voice of the other, which is justice."⁴⁷ This answer comes from a community as life potential.

The ethical concepts introduced by Levinas but expanded by Dussel are not mere abstractions but have had real and tangible effects on the world. Liberation philosophy has been in constant dialogue with so-called progressive governments. This has led to the development of other forms of government, such as the plurinational state of Bolivia as well as to the conceptualization of obediential power (described by Dussel). Likewise, liberation theology has implemented ecclesiastical practices close to the base community. Certainly, these practices promote the idea of a living church that is close to the material needs of those in need. In it the ethical principles of solidarity with the Other are lived. Religious and social organizations on the border share these principles of obedience to the ethical duty toward the victims of the system.

The examples of these organizations, as well as of the migrants themselves, demonstrate that when people fulfill their ethical duty towards the Other, it

is possible to create fairer societies that allow life to flourish. This is due to the expansion of relationships based on ethics, responsibility, and solidarity, which occurs first between the Other and the I, and then among all people. This is an example of how, even under the harshest conditions, a fairer society is possible when the value and dignity of the other is recognized through advocacy, lobbying, and assistance on a wide spectrum of migration issues.

Conclusion

Oppression in Latin America is due to social and economic structures that were created and developed in colonial times. Gaining political independence from Spain and Portugal did not erase these structures that keep indigenous people and dark-skinned mestizos in material conditions of exploitation. This structural racism increased with the implementation of neoliberal economic policies throughout Latin America since the decade of the 1980s. The free market and a for-profit economy were promoted and implemented as the way to modernize the Latin American economy and end poverty. However, as predicted by dependency theory, this did not occur. Rather, structural poverty consistently increased in the countries where these policies were applied. Poor economies and armed conflicts have, since then, forced Central Americans to migrate to the north. Some of them have Mexico as their final destination, while others are looking to reach the United States and, in fewer cases, Canada.

The structures that force people to migrate must be examined and theorized, as they have been by others. However, in this chapter, through Pablo González Casanova's sociology of exploitation, I have focused on the social relations that are enabled by those structures. As González theorizes, these two dimensions are mutually caused. Once this is understood, given its detrimental effect on living conditions it is necessary to offer a normative theory that aids in warding off these oppressive conditions and relations. This search does not need go very far, as migrants are already practicing solidary relationships, as indicated in Dussel's expansion of Levinas's ethical theory. These are manifested in the support networks and assistance migrants provide to each other during their dangerous path to the north. This ethical behavior is also shared by social activists and organizations supporting migrants through shelter, legal assistance, and lobbying services.

Finally, I would like to clarify that by emphasizing the agency of immigrants and their ethical behavior, together with social activists and organizations that succor them, I am not discussing the conditions where this possibility of agency is null. Such is the case when immigrants are captured by criminal organizations and forced to work in illegal farms, mines, or prostitution centers. Clearly, under these conditions, migrants have very little room to exercise their will without taking a high risk of being raped or killed. Again, this is, of course, a serious issue that needs to be addressed. Yet possible solutions to the crisis need to have migrants as the central speakers of the discussions; for this purpose, their ability and knowledge needs to be recognized. In short, oppressive social relations are instances of colonization; reversing those practices is both a form of decolonization and a way to build a fairer system.

Notes

1. Enrique Dussel, *1492: El encubrimiento del Otro* (La Paz: Plural editores, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la educación—UMSA, 1994).
2. Marcos Roitman Rosenmann, *Pensar América Latina* (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2008), 35. In Spanish in the original [Su diferencia estriba en subrayar como causantes del atraso a la oligarquía terrateniente y por ende a una sociedad rural cuya estructura social se caracteriza por el escaso nivel de movilidad social y racionalidad electiva.]
3. For more on the debate between the *laissez passer* and government-driven modernization approaches see José Medina Echavarría, *Consideraciones sociológicas sobre el desarrollo económico de América Latina* (San José: Educa, 1980).
4. C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).
5. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1977), 18. [La estructura social y política se va modificando en la medida en que distintas clases y grupos sociales logran imponer sus intereses, su fuerza y su dominación al conjunto de la sociedad].
6. Pablo González Casanova, *Sociología de la explotación* (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2006), 183. [Una estructura de relaciones sociales de dominio y explotación entre grupos culturales heterogéneos, distintos]. Casanova's contemporary Anibal Quijano describes this phenomenon as "coloniality." For more on the relation between coloniality and migration see Luis Rubén Díaz Cepeda, "Consideraciones éticas de las organizaciones sociales fronterizas en defensa de los Migrantes," in *Migrantes, refugiados y derechos humanos*, ed. Francisco de Jesús Cepeda Rincón and Guadalupe Friné Lucho González (Mexico City: Tirant lo blanc, Paso de la Esperanza A.C., 2019), 63–78.

7. For more on coloniality and social division see Anibal Quijano, "Colonialidad del poder y clasificación social," in *El giro decolonial: Reflexiones para una diversidad epistémica más allá del capitalismo global* (Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre Editores, 2007), 93–127.
8. González Casanova, *Sociología de la explotación*, 18. [La asimetría está ligada a la idea de poder y dominio; es analizada indirectamente como predominio o dependencia, como monopolización de la economía, el poder, la cultura de una nación por otra; o directamente como influencia económica, política y psicológica, que los hombres o las naciones con poder, riqueza, prestigio ejercen sobre los que carecen de ellos o los tienen en grado menor.]
9. Quijano, "Colonialidad del poder," 241. [El colonialismo interno corresponde a una estructura de relacionessociales de dominio y explotación entre grupos culturales heterogéneos, distintos.]
10. Moving forward with his research, by 1999, González noted that these social relations of exploitation were not exclusive to Latin America; rather, exploitation is global. See Pablo González Casanova, "La explotación global," *Memoria* October, no. 116 (1998): 136–63.
11. Susanne Jonas and Nestor Rodríguez, *Guatemala-U.S. Migration: Transforming Regions* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015).
12. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).
13. Alejandro Chanona Burguete and José Ignacio Martínez Cortés, "Las relaciones de México con América Latina bajo un nuevo esquema de integración comercial," in *México-Centroamérica*, ed. Benítez Manaut and Fernández de Castro (Mexico City: Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, 2001).
14. Manuel Ángel Castillo and Mónica Toussaint, "La frontera sur de México: Orígenes y desarrollo dela migración Centroamericana," *Cuadernos Intercambio Sobre Centroamérica y El Caribe* 12, no. 2 (July–December 2015): 59–86.
15. Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (Acnur-México), *Protección y asistencia de refugiados en América Latina: Documentos regionales 1981–1999* (Mexico City: ACNUR, 2000).
16. Manuel Ángel Castillo, "The Mexico-Guatemala Border: New Controls on Transborder Migrations in View of Recent Integration Schemes?" *Frontera Norte* 15, no. 29 (June 2003): 51.
17. Secretaría de gobernación, Instituto Nacional de Migración, "Ley de Migración y Su Reglamento," 2012, http://www.inm.gob.mx/static/marco_juridico/pdf/Ley_de_Migracion_y_Reglamento.pdf.
18. Daniel Vázquez and Sandra Serrano, "Enfoque de derechos humanos y migración," in *Política migratoria y derechos de los migrantes en México*, ed. Velia Cecilia Bobes León (Mexico City: FLACSO, 2018), 26.
19. As it happened in 2019, when the Mexican army was ordered by President Lopez Obrador to prevent Central American migrants from reaching the borderline between Mexico and the United States.

20. Helena, interview by author, December 15, 2019. (Name changed to protect her identity).
21. Lindsey Carte, "Everyday Restriction: Central American Women and the State in the Mexico-Guatemala Border City of Tapachula," *International Migration Review* 48, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 114.
22. Josiah Heyman, Jeremy Slack, and Emily Guerra, "Bordering a 'Crisis': Central American Asylum Seekers and the Reproduction of Dominant Border Enforcement Practices," *Journal of the Southwest* 60, no. 4 (Winter 2018): 755.
23. Jenaro Villamil, "Cómo se gestó el multitudinario 'desplazamiento forzado,'" November 4, 2018, *Proceso*, <https://www.proceso.com.mx/558263/como-se-gesto-el-multitudinario-desplazamiento-forzado>.
24. Josiah Heyman and Jeremy Slack, "Blockading Asylum Seekers at Ports of Entry at the US-Mexico Border Puts Them at Increased Risk of Exploitation, Violence, and Death," Center for Migration Studies, June 25, 2018, <https://cmsny.org/publications/heyman-slack-asylum-poe/>.
25. Heyman and Slack, "Blockading Asylum Seekers."
26. Ivan, interview by author, May 27, 2020. Name has been changed to protect the identity of the interviewee. [Me voy a ir por ese lado, ya sé que ahí no hay muro. Estos días es un buen momento para hacerlo, pos como no puedo cargar mucha comida, aprovecho que hay agua en las montañas por las lluvias. Ya me la sé.]
27. Joe Biden for President, "The Biden Plan for Securing our Values as a Nation of Immigrants," accessed June 12, 2021, <https://joebiden.com/immigration/>.
28. Jorge Lowerree and Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, "Tracking the Biden Agenda on Legal Immigration in the First 100 Days," American Immigration Council, April 29, 2021, <https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/tracking-biden-agenda-legal-immigration-first-100-days>.
29. Ana Laura Ramírez Vazquéz, interview by author.
30. Ankie Hoogvelt, *Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 145, as cited in Fernando Coronil, "Naturaleza del poscolonialismo: Del Eurocentrismo al globocentrismo," in *La Colonialidad del saber: Eurocentrismo y ciencias sociales. Perspectivas Latinoamericanas*, ed. Edgardo Lander (Buenos Aires: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, 2000), 101.
31. Jaime Rivas Castillo, "¿Víctimas nada más?: Migrantes Centroamericanos en El Soconusco, Chiapas," *Nueva Antropol [Online]* 24, no. 74 (2001): 9–38.
32. Carl Schmitt, *El concepto de lo político* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1991).
33. Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity*, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985).
34. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 24.
35. Emmanuel Levinas, *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* (Paris: Le livre de poche, 1978), 178.
36. Levinas, *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence*, 168.

37. Emmanuel Levinas, *El humanismo del otro hombre* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI editores, 1974), 132.
38. The author wants to express his gratitude to Lily Lara Romero and José Manuel Hernández Franco for their generous hospitality and assistance to conduct this research.
39. Migrant group, interview by author, December 6, 2019. [No, no vamos a dejar a este bato aquí, lo conocimos hace unos días, veníamos juntos en el tren, en la Bestia, veníamos bien, pero ahí estaba un retén y pos brincamos. Le tocó a él, mala suerte, ya veníamos muy bien. Pero así esto, ¿Cómo lo vamos a dejar solo? No, aquí esperamos. Vamos todos juntos.]
40. Enrique Dussel, "Sobre el sujeto y la intersubjetividad: El agente histórico como actor en los movimientos sociales," *Pasos*, no. 84 (July–August 1999): 85.
41. Enrique Dussel, *Ética de la liberación en la edad de la globalización y de la exclusión* (Madrid: Trota, 1998), 309.
42. Enrique Dussel, *20 tesis de política* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 2006), 72.
43. Enrique Dussel, "De la fraternidad a la solidaridad," in *Pablo de Tarso en la filosofía política actual y otros ensayos* (Mexico City: Ediciones Paulina, 2012), 106.
44. Enrique Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation*, trans. Martínez Aquila (New York: Orbis Books, 1985), 17.
45. Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation*, 19.
46. Dussel, *Ética de la liberación*, 30.
47. Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation*, 47.