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This book is dedicated to Professor Alan F. J. Artibise

Alan F. J. Artibise is provost emeritus at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley. His career accomplishments in higher education are immense and exemplary. In addition to scholarship and academic leadership in history, political science, and multidisciplinary fields, Professor Artibise has inspired and supported extensive research about borders and borderlands throughout North America. Artibise was among the leaders of the Borderlands Project established in the 1980s and a researcher and commentator about Cascadia, arguably the vanguard borderland initiative between Canada and the United States. Although Professor Artibise dedicated the last several decades of his career to universities along the southern boundary of the United States—from Louisiana to Arizona—his formative experience in research, teaching, and administration was in Canada, where he worked in institutions in British Columbia, Manitoba, and Ontario. Professor Artibise epitomizes the North American scholarly curiosity, experience, and accomplishment that extends across borders throughout the continent. In this era of barriers and walls, we need to acknowledge those who work to understand borders and take us beyond them. Thank you, Alan.

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PART I

Replacing Borders Between Mexico, the United States, and Canada

CHAPTER 1

Actors, Strategic Fields, and Game Rules

Examining Governance at the U.S.-Mexico Border in the Twenty-First Century

TONY PAYAN

The end of the Cold War profoundly affected the nature of governance at the U.S.-Mexico border. By 1990, as the iron curtain was falling in Europe and the Soviet Union was collapsing, Mexico and the United States moved to deepen their strategic relationship through one of the most avant-garde trade agreements of its time, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The two countries then sought to achieve unprecedented cooperation on public safety and security issues. Simultaneously, and unilaterally, however, the United States moved to vastly expand its surveillance and control of all border flows, legal and illegal, by deploying a security apparatus that would turn the borderlands into a region under the dominance of an increasingly well-articulated security and law enforcement apparatus. These contradictory actions, the economic and commercial opening of the border and the security-motivated closing of the border, reconfigured the border's governance system in a way that prevails to this day. Although the Trump administration has brought NAFTA under scrutiny and has called for a border wall—moves that challenge the idea of a binational strategic partnership—the treaty is likely to survive and border security, with or without a wall, is likely to harden further. Using concepts from *A Theory of Fields* by Fligstein and McAdam (2015), this essay examines the character and nature of governance at the border primarily through an in-depth examination of the actors who populate and interact on the border.



FIGURE 1.1 Number of free trade agreements in the world (Source: World Trade Organization, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm)

Introduction

The last decade of the twentieth century was a decade of great optimism. Globally, the end of the Cold War in 1990 brought about a renewed push for international liberalism, including unprecedented economic openness, measured by a flurry of regional cross-border commercial activity (fig. 1.1) and a wave of democratic transitions (Huntington 1991). The apparent triumph of commercial and political liberalism made some proclaim that we had reached "the end of history" (Fukuyama 1992). In North America, the 1994 NAFTA—negotiated by Canada, the United States, and Mexico—was in fact one of the greatest symbols of the newfound faith in commercial regional integration and debordering. Mexico also began a push for democratic openness, seeking to join the club of industrialized democracies—a club to which the United States and Canada already belonged.

Not all was well at the U.S.-Mexico border, however. Even as NAFTA was providing new cross-border business opportunities, Mexico was engaged in a democratic transition, and optimism about regional integration was growing, the United States moved aggressively to reinforce its border with Mexico. Washing-

ton began putting in place a set of policies and building infrastructure to control tightly all border flows. As these measures paradoxically advanced through the 1990s and accelerated after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, they would have a profound influence in transforming the U.S.-Mexico border—how it is governed and who governs it. In this new hardened border landscape, different actors would seek to position themselves to push for their own vision of the border. Some were favored by this trend; others would simply be left to react.

Who are these actors vying for influence at the U.S.-Mexico border? What are their interests? What are their strategies? Four collective actors are identified as the central players in the border strategic field. First, as NAFTA accelerated trade and business opportunities across the border, economic actors reaffirmed their view of the border as a strategic resource (Sohn 2014). Transnational corporations and investors, many of whom had already dotted the border through the maquiladora industry, moved to take advantage of the new commercial rules. Their vision was one of an open, flexible, and maybe even seamless border to take advantage of labor cost differentials and reduce transaction costs.

Second, border civil society—borderlanders in general—was another important collective actor. They, too, advocated for a more open order, pushing for worker rights, reduction of violence, an increase in the borderlands' quality of life, and bureaucratic accountability of government agencies operating along the border. They saw the reconfiguration of the border as affecting borderlanders and civil society organizations the most. Their lives and opportunities for cross-border activity were in effect reshaped dramatically by the new rigid conditions of the borderlands and the increase in border law enforcement discretionary power and lack of accountability.

Third, criminal organizations—from drug trafficking organizations to human smuggling groups—asserted themselves as strategic actors in the field. They proved themselves to be capable of learning and adapting to a changed border and to be very effective in dealing with the new environment in order to continue to conduct their black-market business.

Finally, anticipating strategic behavior by less desirable actors—for example, human smugglers, undocumented migrants, drug trafficking organizations, and others—U.S. government principals (politicians) and agents (bureaucracies) deployed unprecedented resources to control border flows, erected new barriers and fencing, introduced novel technologies to stem illegal flows, and added thousands of border patrol and customs agents (Maril 2004; Payan 2006; Chomsky 2009; Dunn 2010; Andreas 2012; Payan 2016). In this atmosphere

of increased cross-border flows and unprecedented efforts to control them, law enforcement agencies became the central players, well above the rest of the other collective actors populating the border strategic field. Their vision of the border was one where they controlled all flows across the borderline with little or no liability (table 1.1).

The reshuffling of actors and interests at the border constituted the most important factor restructuring the border space (Flynn 2000) and provided the impetus for the cross-border governance system that prevails to this day. The cross-border governance system of the last quarter century has also experienced three key moments that have served to consolidate its composition: the mid-1990s military-style law enforcement operations, the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the 2016 election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States. Faced with these external shocks, each actor was forced to reassess its position in the border action field and to act strategically to preserve (defensive) or expand (offensive) its vision and its prerogatives and privileges in the borderlands. Because all players—economic actors, cross-border civil society, criminal organizations, and law enforcement—want to play a role in cross-border governance, the field has become a dynamic environment where each responds to the other and each seeks to exert influence over the field's units of governance—laws, regulations, processes, and procedures—in order to incorporate their interests into them.

On the sidelines, the scholarly community, too, set out to understand the paradoxical trends at the border and to study and craft new concepts to comprehend changes at the border in the twenty-first century. An important inter-

TABLE 1.1 Collective actors in the border action field and their interests within the strategic action field

	Business and corporate	Civil society and borderlanders	Criminal organizations and groups	Law enforcement and security
Interest	Open, flexible, seamless border to take advantage of cross-border labor cost differentials and minimize business transaction costs	Relatively open border with increased access and stricter adherence to due process and human rights	Understanding control of border flows to find and exploit vulnerabilities in the system to smuggle drugs and people	Closed border with tightly managed border ports of entry and strict border flows control with absolute discretion and no public accountability

pretation of the emerging border structure came from an examination of the physical transformation of the U.S.-Canadian border. It relates to the idea that the governance system on the ground is primarily influenced by the creation of secured corridors and gateways and a dramatic reinforcement of the line between gateways (Konrad and Nicol 2008). The idea behind border control strategies was to build a border that facilitated economic activity through tightly controlled corridors and gateways while attempting to fend off "undesirable" actors along the line between and at ports of entry. The literature on *rebordering* processes has since exploded along these lines. But however we conceive the border, scholars of border studies will likely have to theorize harder and appeal to many disciplines simultaneously. Thus, to understand the character and nature of governance at the U.S.-Mexico border today—thirty years after the end of the Cold War—this chapter uses key concepts from Fligstein and McAdam's (2015) strategic action field (SAF) theory. SAF, as a sociological theory, provides for: (1) the *action field* or space where all interaction among players occurs; (2) the *actors* vying for influence in the action field; (3) the *strategic behavior* of the players, who pursue their interests over those of the other players in the field; (4) the *units of governance*—laws, regulations, processes, and procedures—that all players seek to capture and by which all players must abide; and (5) the external shocks to the environment, which begins periods of contention where different players seek to defend or advance their interests. This chapter argues that by focusing on SAF actors—whom Fligstein and McAdam (2012) divide into *incumbents* and *challengers* and who interact competitively in the border space to shape the units of governance in their favor—it is possible to understand how the border is governed and who governs it today as well as the character and nature of cross-border governance.

A More Complex Framework and Methodology

An adjustment to Fligstein and McAdam's theoretical framework is merited here. Although their SAF theory is applicable to many different issue areas, borders are particularly complex SAFs because they are fields crossed by robust lines of demarcation, exclusive jurisdictions, joint policy areas with different national approaches, and institutional variation from one side to the other. All of this further complicates using the theory to understand border governance. The border is not just a policy field but a space in motion (Konrad 2015), contested (Anderson

and O'Dowd 1999b), negotiable (Allmendinger et al. 2015), resisted (Bejarano 2010), but especially bifurcated by national lines. The border as a policy space is hardly ever completely settled—something it shares with other issue areas contained within a country—but its governance is the result of structures negotiated by the actors inhabiting within a national SAF and between them and actors inhabiting a different national SAF across a borderline. Thus, players seek to project their organizational and individual interests in the entire binational SAF and to act and react, operate and resist, compete and cooperate, and ultimately dominate and impose their vision of the border in a complicated space where power projection is not unidimensional or linear but complex and multilayered.

Moreover, the U.S.-Mexico border is neither a "thin" nor a "thick" border (Haselsberger 2014). Although central governments weigh heavily, the border SAF is never entirely fixed from above. On the contrary, as in any SAF, agency matters in generating various levels and degrees of competition and domination of the governance units. The skills required are even more complex because actors must navigate between two legal and institutional policy systems and must relate to other players in the field and to the masters above in the national hierarchy. Thus, power practices matter substantially as SAF actors negotiate their place in and use of the border and seek to extract its benefits for themselves and their group. In that sense, the U.S.-Mexico border has developed endogenous inertias (Medina García 2006) that have nothing to do with the central government. These inertias reflect an amalgam of lines and flows that show marked differences by and for different actors as they interact horizontally and vertically. Finally, as Fligstein and McAdam would have it, in the border SAF, the units of governance are never neutral. Instead, they are the very instruments of governance system control. The units of governance are not all the same for everyone but are always negotiated and resisted, sometimes issue by issue, flow by flow, gate by gate, and corridor by corridor. Contemplating the border SAF from above, it is easy to appreciate it as a highly dynamic field, the various actors jockeying for position within it, and ultimately to determine the character and nature of cross-border governance and who enjoys privileges and access and who suffers disadvantages and denial of access. Additionally, there is a fundamental misunderstanding about the U.S.-Mexico border. Despite increased controls, its dynamism at the micro level is more like that of a frontier because it is a zone of interpenetration between two peoples, many of whom share cultural, social, and linguistic traits and view the boundary as largely artificial, albeit real in its effect (Parker 2006). The border is thus constructed into a complicated matrix of overlapping problems and issues, jurisdictions and interests, and desires and aspirations. And all SAF actors pursue their own vision of themselves and the borderlands in this matrix. When confronted with power differentials, they create their own dynamics of domination and resistance and continuously renegotiate privileges and access.

At an empirical level, to understand governance at the U.S.-Mexico border, this chapter relies on seventy-one interviews with key actors on the border conducted between 2013 and 2014. The interviewees come from elected officials, the security community, the business and entrepreneurial class, and members of the borderland's civil society. All interviews were carried out in the Paso del Norte region and were done by members of a larger research team. The interviews lasted from thirty minutes to an hour and a half each. The questions asked were semistructured to allow the interviewees to explain how they view themselves and their organizations in the border space, who they think "governs" the borderlands, and how different players have carved out spaces for themselves and their organizations within the border SAF. Questions were also asked about how they have pursued their interests and those of their group and how they have had to negotiate with the dominant players and the content of the governance units on a day-to-day basis. From these interviews, this study assembles the processes of flows to investigate the nature of governance in the SAF, how the units of governance that prevail in the border space are defined, and the privilege and access that various actors can negotiate for themselves. It thereby shows how the various actors continue to negotiate governance structures to preserve the border as a resource. Finally, the study included an open survey conducted through Survey Monkey with many of the same and additional actors.

The next section briefly examines the nature of the border SAF. The following sections then analyze each of the collective actors who interact within it and their strategic behavior—how they interact with one another—to answer the central question of who governs the border. Finally, the chapter draws conclusions about the nature of the governance system at the U.S.-Mexico border as seen through an examination of the actors and their behavior in the SAF.

The Border Strategic Action Field

The strategic action field (SAF) examined here, namely, "the border," is not easy to define—it can geographically stretch in many different directions

and reach many different proportions (Payan and Cruz 2017) and it can have different meanings for different actors (Van Houtum 2005). Indeed, the border means different things to different SAF players depending on the action, the public policy issue at hand, the actors involved, the territorial area of the intended action, and whether the action is horizontal—toward other actors in the SAF—or vertical—toward the national political actors or principals. In this sense, this chapter does not attempt to define the border territorially or to resolve the problem of its meaning to understand cross-border governance. Instead, it assumes that the best way to understand the nature of cross-border governance is to look at the border as a "strategic action field" (SAF)—a space where actors compete to become *governors* of the field, however they define it. It also assumes that by focusing on who the SAF actors are—their interests, their skills, as well as their structural advantages within the SAF—it is possible to understand the character and nature of cross-border governance. In that sense, looking at the border SAF and the actors who populate it, three features stand out: (1) players in the field navigate the tension between policies directed at maintaining an open border and policies directed at controlling the border; (2) the security paradigm that prevails today creates structural *field environment* advantages for some and disadvantages for others; and (3) the embeddedness of the border SAF within a larger political context tests the actors' skills to pursue their vision of the border by leveraging resources outside the field. Let us break down each of these features.

First, the border SAF is characterized by a fundamental tension between opening and closing. This tension provides the first layer on which the border governance system has grown for a quarter century—perhaps much longer—and it stems from two competing visions of the border, both of which emerged at the end of the Cold War. One came from the political Right in the United States, with law enforcement as its instrument, and the other from an amalgam of advocates of free trade, immigration, and human rights. The former implied increasing control of border flows and a gradual closing of the border. This group seems to have reached its apex in the policies of the Trump administration. The latter group implied a gradual, albeit orderly, opening of the border. To be sure, there were serious attempts at reconciling these visions of the border. The Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America is an agreement that tried in fact to reconcile these two contradictory forces (Villarreal and Lake 2009), but it did not have much success in creating a political coalition to do so. The SPP initiative was practically stillborn, as its timing was not

auspicious, and it faced political resistance and institutional dysfunctions in all countries (Gluszek 2014). This tension provides the background against which border actors pursue their interests.

Second, there is a growing national and international ideological context focused on security as the summum bonum. Borders have in fact become a major focus of this ideological bent. As such, the U.S.-Mexico border SAF has come increasingly under the definition of a security paradigm—with an increasingly militarized outlook. Most public policy issues came to be negotiated within a framework that prioritizes border security. All players in the borderlands (from federal bureaucracies to local businesses, corporations, governments at all levels, civil society organizations, organized criminals, and individuals) interact with governance units—laws, regulations, processes, and procedures—heavily influenced by the border security paradigm. This provides a structural advantage to actors focused on border security; they have created a virtuous cycle for themselves, arguing at every turn that the border is a "dangerous" place and placing themselves at the center of the solution to border insecurity. Moreover, U.S.-Mexico border security policies are not today confined to the borderlands. There is a deliberate policy to deploy policy instruments forward to neutralize "border threats" before they arrived at the ports of entry or the borderline by preclearing travelers and cargo and exercising denial of access well before arrival at the borderline (Purcell and Nevins 2005; Bowman 2007; Bersin 2015). To reinforce this form of governance—a heavily militarized borderline and a forward deployment of the border—initiatives were born to make the border "smarter" (U.S. Department of State 2002; Ackleson 2003) without really specifying why the border was not smart in the first place—something that suggests that "smart" is essentially a code word for far-reaching control by actors who favor security (Purcell and Nevins 2005) and the creation of a rights-free zone (Doty 2007; Salter 2008). This trend, already under way in the 1990s, was reinforced by the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the political anxiety that followed. After 9/11, the initial instinct was to close the border tightly, although in the end there emerged a debate on how to balance border security and national prosperity (Villarreal and Lake 2009; U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2015). Still, over time, it was clear that the terrorist attacks of 2001 provided additional impetus for the idea that security is primordial and additional justifications for the security-focused bureaucratic scaffolding that was already being built in the 1990s. September 11, for example, provided further rationale to reorganize border government agencies to further securitize

functions that had been previously viewed as largely administrative (Brunet-Jailly 2005; Payan 2016). Moreover, the new security environment loosened the nexus between bureaucracy and democracy as agencies became less accountable for their power uses and abuses (Balla and Gormley 2017). This basic framework (controlled corridors and gateways, forward deployment of the border, and a state of exception at the borderlands) prevailed through the Obama administration. It seems poised to become even more rigid during the Trump administration. Indeed, the 2016 presidential election in the United States did away with all pretentions of balancing security and prosperity. The Trump administration appears to have resolved the tension between prosperity and security once and for all in favor of the latter. There are plans to accelerate the securitization of the border by adding thousands of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and U.S. Border Patrol agents, building a two-thousand-mile concrete wall, and revising NAFTA in favor of a more nationalist economic paradigm. The Trump administration's proposals seem to be a natural step in a historical trend to expand and harden border control. Although scholars over the last two decades have invested much time and energy studying and advocating for cross-border integration (CBI), geo-economic mobility, and cross-border territorial projects (Sohn 2014), all such concepts apply less and less to the U.S.-Mexico border, even if there are small successes, such as the Tijuana Airport CBX project (McCartney 2016).

Third, the border SAF remains embedded in a larger context—a politically motivated support for absolute control of the border. The political profit to be had by elected officials, many of whom ultimately determine the shape and form that the units of governance take, is enormous, and the costs for castigating the borderlands are too low. Border security agencies are ultimately implementers of a political use of the border. They have also proven extremely capable of connecting with the broader or external political environment that frames border policies. Governing the border remains in fact an activity strongly centralized in the two nations' capitals in the hands of elected officials, the principals, in sync with the ground agents, law enforcement. The principals—political actors—and their agents—law enforcement—found in fact a way of marrying their interests by building an image of the border as an insecure place. This was easy, as all actors in an SAF make their own social history, sometimes at odds and sometimes in line with the centralized political and economic powers of the nation-state (Baud 1997), but they must necessarily accommodate directives that come from above. When these interests line up, they are mutually reinforcing,

as in the case of the U.S.-Mexico border. In the end, there was relatively little input from most other local SAF actors in the public policy process (Payan 2010) when it came to the border. All interaction between border actors in the SAF cut through the directives that came down from political principals beyond the borderland.

The border governance system today is largely the result of these features of the border SAF—tensions between two visions of the border, an increased dominance of the security paradigm, and the compatibility between politically motivated central directives and the priorities of border law enforcement actors. These features of the border SAF create structural advantages for certain actors in border governance—the incumbents—and place nearly all others at a disadvantage—the challengers. And although the meaning and significance of borders can change over space and time (Anderson and O'Dowd 1999a) and the issue at hand, actors negotiate their own place on the border (Wilson and Donnan 1998) and pursue their interests within these structural constraints. This environment in fact tests the skills of all challengers to negotiate their place in the SAF in the face of border security agency dominance. Interestingly, even under these conditions of near absolute dominance by one actor—law enforcement—the border is always in motion (Konrad 2015) and always being interrogated (Tripathi 2015).

To illustrate this further, we can see how trends are self-reinforcing, perpetuating the structural orientation of governance and making mounting a challenge ever more difficult. For example, while NAFTA projected the border as a valuable resource for economic actors whose agenda shifted in favor of open borders in the 1990s (Newman 2003), it became increasingly difficult for other noneconomic actors (e.g., civil society) to cross that same border to take advantage of old or new opportunities. For many, those usually at the bottom of the socioeconomic rungs, the border became in fact a militarized space with harsh consequences (Slack et al. 2016). This resulted in increasing numbers of migrant deaths (Cornelius 2001; Rubio-Goldsmith et al. 2016) and multiple violations of human rights (Staudt, Payan, and Kruszewski 2009; Simmons and Mueller 2014). What that means is that the most vulnerable of all border users saw their vulnerability compounded by the dominance of those actors who positioned themselves as the border guards. Paradoxically, even as the security scaffolding directed at migrants and border residents grew, there was no noticeable change in drug trafficking. This should not be surprising. Drug trafficking and other actors dedicated to illegal activities are also strategic players who adjust quickly

and adeptly to new conditions in the border SAF. All statistics point in that direction. Thus, when it comes to the war on drugs at the border SAF, border residents were affected more than drug traffickers (Chalabi 2016). Border residents as a group will not be discussed here, but they are never absent, as they, too, are used rhetorically by the governors of the border to continue building their rhetorical advantage—the border SAF as a dangerous place—and to place themselves as the solution to the same danger.

Having surveyed the central features of the border SAF, it must now be said that all actors must be examined in their structural context if we are to understand the nature of cross-border governance. For economic actors and entrepreneurs, the border became an area of great opportunities to conduct business, to profit from important price differentials in labor and supply markets, and to take advantage of structural tax incentives—witness the still-strong border maquiladora industry (Cañas et al. 2013). But for immigrants, the border SAF became a liminal space, the difference between a bad and a better life (Fourny 2013) and sometimes the difference between life and death. For shoppers, the border SAF represented an opportunity to stretch their hard-earned family earnings (Baruca and Zolfagharian 2013), but they, too, had to put up with stricter controls in their use of the border as a resource. For security actors, however, the border became a space where they can exert their bureaucratic imperialism impulses (Roberts 1976) even as smugglers of illegal goods and humans continue finding opportunities to do business (Passas 2003). In fact, the law enforcement and criminal cat and mouse side game cannot be understood but in the context of the larger cross-border governance system and its structure. The list of players goes on depending on the granular focus of the observer. Thus, the border SAF is primarily a competitive space where actors pursue their interests, negotiate and resist, and attempt to implement their own vision of the border, ideally, by capturing the governance units.

The dynamic nature of the field is reinforced by a lack of binational institutions. Unlike Europe, North America is characterized by low and uneven levels of institutionalization with a relative absence of binational frameworks for local governments to exercise varying degrees of functionally pooled sovereignty (Payan 2010; Payan and Cruz 2018). Some areas exhibit greater degrees of institutionalized cooperation (Spalding 2000), while other issues are approached both unilaterally and largely from the great centers of power, such as Washington, D.C., or Mexico City. Areas of lesser institutionalized cooperation magnify, quantitatively and qualitatively, the areas of potential conflict among actors on

the ground, providing them with more opportunities to assert their interests—witness the perverse dance between law enforcement agents and drug traffickers at the borderline (Sanderson 2004; Payan 2016). However, local actors are not powerless. They do push against the units of governance and those who would enforce them. Some negotiate spaces of privilege with the actors who govern the border space; for example, the wealthy and international corporations can use fast lanes for precleared travelers and merchandise (Sparke 2006), while other border users are excluded and even criminalized (Ackerman and Furman 2013). Thus, the border is subject to continuous motion (Konrad 2015), contestation (Anderson and O'Dowd 1999b), reinterpretation (Newman 2001), low and uneven levels of institutionalization (Payan and Cruz 2018), multiple gray areas (Vergani and Collins 2015), all making for a field of action where all players have to craft their rhetoric, exert whatever influence they can over the governance units, accommodate or resist the goals of others, and seek to position themselves to dominate the SAF.

Field domination is an existential drive, and a border SAF is no different—all actors in the space jockey to achieve dominance amid their own constraints and opportunities. Since the 1990s, the main rhetorical portrayal of the U.S.-Mexico border has been that of insecurity (Ackleson 2005), and that has given the advantage to actors who "provide" security or hold the promise of increased security in the space. That image has been constructed and reaffirmed over time by bureaucracies that would benefit materially from that image and politicians who would profit politically from the moral panic they create (Hughes 2007). This rhetoric has generated policies that give a structural or material advantage to those same actors who back a security agenda. All other actors are left to react. The next section examines each of the actors who populate the border action field, describing how each behaves and examining the final power arrangement within the field.

The Field Actors

In theory, any SAF is populated by actors who at a minimum pursue their interests or preferably seek to dominate the SAF they inhabit by capturing the units of governance—laws, regulations, processes, and procedures—and reshaping them to embody their interests and their vision of the field. Sometimes SAF actors behave cooperatively and sometimes competitively, but all strive to influence the governance units—laws, rules, regulations, procedures,

and processes—because doing so is the most efficient way to survival and dominance. The alternative is a highly competitive field where no one dominates and high degrees of competition and conflicts ensue. That scenario requires too much energy and produces too much uncertainty. If a given SAF actor achieves control of the governance units, the capturing actor becomes the SAF incumbent. Those who at any one point are not considered incumbents are, essentially, challengers of the status quo in one way or another. This section examines the incumbents and the challengers of the U.S.-Mexico border field of action, as an efficient heuristic analysis to understand who governs the border SAF.

The Security Community: The Incumbents

Since the 1990s, the U.S.-Mexico border has been primarily governed by actors whose instruments to dominate the governance units have been crafted around the concept of security. They have taken the historical, rhetorical, and structural advantage for nearly three decades—since the end of the Cold War—continuously working to reinforce all three advantages and creating a cycle of dominance for them. They have shown themselves to have skills to leverage these advantages to position themselves in the border SAF. As trends in dealing with public and international affairs have become permeated by the concept of security (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998), for example, border security actors have positioned themselves to take advantage of legislative processes, regulatory benefits, and budgetary advances to be increasingly dominant, and they have expanded their discretionary power as well (Landau 2016). At key junctures, such as the events of September 11, security border SAF players have advanced the rhetorical display on security, reaffirming a historical trend and compounding their structural advantage. The U.S. Border Patrol, for example, has increased its budget steadily from 1990 through 2017 (fig. 1.2) by convincing political actors that the border SAF is lawless and overrun by criminals (Cabrera 2015). U.S. Customs and Border Protection has also grown substantially since its creation in 2002 (fig. 1.3).

Consequently, in the U.S.-Mexico border field of action, the incumbents are the security community—Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and state and local law enforcement agencies who have been deputized as border guards (e.g., the Texas Department of Public Safety [State of Texas, Legislative Budget Board 2016]). Actors charged with "securing" the border have in effect been skillful



FIGURE 1.2 U.S. Border Patrol budget since 1990 (Source: US Border Patrol Fiscal Year Budget Statistics 1990–2017, https://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/us-border-patrol-fiscal-year-budget-statistics-fy-1990-fy-2017, accessed January 31, 2018 [no longer posted])



FIGURE 1.3 U.S. Customs and Border Protection budget since 2003 (Source: American Immigration Council 2017; US Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief, FY 2005–2017, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_cost_of_immigration_enforcement_and_border_security.pdf and https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget., accessed January 31, 2018 [no longer posted])

at advancing their interest in dominating the border governance system. It is enough, for example, to see that immigration, a phenomenon intimately connected with the border, went from an agency within the Department of Labor to an agency within the Department of Justice to an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (Payan 2016). At the same time, they have themselves contributed to building momentum for their favored vision of the border space as a lawless region in dire need of order—one where they can provide just the remedy (Johnson 2011). And they have been favored by the gray areas created by lower levels of institutionalization. The result is that security has become the lens through which all border activities are examined—economic activity, human mobility, natural resources and the environment, health issues, and every other concern that runs across the U.S.-Mexico border. As security is a priori above all other cross-border activity, the agents behind security are well positioned to capture the system of governance.

Clearly, the units of governance—laws, rules, procedures, and processes—are therefore never neutral. They embody and project the interests of the so-called incumbents—the actors who have, through a combination of historical, rhetorical, and structural advantages as well as their own skills have managed to become the governors of the field. In our case, the U.S.-Mexico border space has become dominated by law enforcement agencies, all of which have acquired an increasingly militarized outlook as they seek to project power and the ability to make the borderlands more "secure." Naturally, if security has buoyed to the top as the number one priority for the nation and the border, the actors who champion themselves as the guarantors of security would be best positioned to capture the space and implement their vision of the border.

The Border Business Community: The Politics of Division

A major assumption in the theoretical framework used for this analysis (Fligstein and McAdam 2015) is that players in the action field can be divided into two categories: incumbents—those who have maneuvered to capture the units of governance to realize their interests—and challengers—those who are relatively unhappy with the action field power distribution and desire to modify the units of governance to reflect their interests. The interviews conducted for this study reveal a different picture, considerably more nuanced. Action field players who can be considered challengers possess different skills and have different resources at their disposal, and they also possess different interests, which may

not necessarily coincide. Thus, not all challengers are the same and sometimes they compete among themselves. This cleavage among challengers is evident in the border governance system.

On the U.S.-Mexico border, the entrepreneurial class, propped up by their business connections with international corporations, has had both the skills and the resources to steer itself into a position of privilege in its interactions with the incumbents—a position of privilege constructed partly on the distance they keep from the working class and social activists in the border field. The interviews with several of the subjects of this study show that the entrepreneurial class in fact enjoys liberties and privileges directly related to their higher socioeconomic status. When crossing the borderline, for example, most of them make use of the designated commuter, or SENTRI (Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection), lanes—a privilege predicated largely on the ability to pay (in addition to being considered a "trusted traveler"). Many of them consider themselves binational, hold dual citizenship, own real estate and businesses on both sides of the border, marry each other, and generally lament the fact that the border is largely "closed" and that it is not "what it used to be." Thus, their desire for a "more open" border makes them challengers since they would likely benefit from more open borders but are still obliged to negotiate spaces of privilege with the true incumbents—the security community. The fact that they enjoy negotiated access privileges also puts distance between them and the rest of the challengers. Indeed, they enjoy an elevated level of mobility and cross-border access that most people on the border do not. This is further exacerbated by the inequality in wealth and income along the U.S.-Mexico border, which further separates various socioeconomic classes, giving the richer groups a buoyancy in the system of governance not available to the poorer classes (Peach 1997; Esparza and Donelson 2008; Moré 2011; Anderson and Gerber 2017).

Moreover, during the dozens of hours of interviews, there were practically no manifestations of solidarity with the working class among the entrepreneurial-class interviewees. Their conception of the border is one where business is impeded by the security apparatus and the status quo is somewhat discouraging, but the burdens on the overall cross-border civil society (Payan and Vásquez 2007) are not problematic per se. Many saw the maquiladoras, for example, as the symbol of border development and prosperity despite alternative narratives that claim that workers are exploited and even pauperized by the industry (La Botz 1994; Staudt and Coronado 2002; Gibbs 2004; Wójtowicz and Winiarczyk-Raźniak 2014; and many other works) and that maquiladoras have contributed

to serious violations of legal and human rights (Lusk, Staudt, and Moya 2012; Simmons and Mueller 2014). Mobilizing civil society in their view would not necessarily be to their advantage. Consequently, most of the interviewees within the entrepreneurial group viewed the border as a resource (Sohn 2014), and their ability to take full advantage of it was evident, but they did not speak to border agent treatment of border crossers or poverty or militarization of the border. One of their fundamental preoccupations, instead, was with the economic losses caused by long wait lines at the ports of entry—something directly related to their interests. For instance, the San Diego Association of Governments (2016) has commissioned several studies to quantify the losses to businesses. All along the border, the entrepreneurial class appears to be narrowly focused on their interests, and they negotiate with the incumbents accordingly. Thus, although the business class may appear to be incumbents in the governance scape, the privileges that they enjoy in the field are primarily negotiated with the true incumbents—the security community, in whose hands lie the governance units.

At the U.S.-Mexico border, market players have therefore taken advantage of the asymmetry to exploit comparative advantages on one side or the other, but they do not negotiate within their group, the challengers. Instead, they negotiate with incumbents based on their narrower interests. There is very little solidarity with the rest of the actors who could be labeled challengers. Thus, the challengers are arranged hierarchically, with civil society—workers, nongovernmental organizations, and the general population toward the bottom of the border hierarchy. This arrangement is largely propped up by the prevailing ideology, security and neoliberalism, an important structural advantage that confines each actor to its layer in the field, although this structure may be eroding with the shifts in the political landscape under the Trump administration. Clearly, the security community is best positioned to advance its interests under the new administration, and the economic actors stand to lose ground, which explains why many of them have quickly mobilized to defend NAFTA, a framework under siege by the Trump government. One such business organization is the newly formed Texas-Mexico Trade Coalition (2017), whose mission is to defend the prevailing economic structure.

Workers and Civil Society: The Governed

The U.S.-Mexico border has nearly fifteen million residents and a long history of cross-border contacts—from mass migrations (Monroy 1999) to contraband

(Díaz 2015) to protest (Hathaway 2000). The overwhelming majority of these fifteen million borderlanders belong to the working class. They fill the relatively low-paying jobs in the region and labor under enormous wage disparities (Clemens 2015). They are tethered to their territorial communities and have little or no cross-border mobility. They are generally the object of suspicion, surveillance, and control by law enforcement (Andreas 2012) even though the link between poverty and security and crime is controversial (Sharkey, Besbris, and Friedson 2016) and in spite of the fact that the U.S. side of the border remains one of the safest areas in the country according to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. For them the border is not a readily available resource. Moreover, they bear some of the steepest costs of social, health, and environmental problems at the border (Bastida, Brown, and Pagán 2008), and they engage in a daily struggle to survive rends in the social fabric caused by stricter law enforcement and the violence inflicted by criminal groups. Most border residents enjoy few of the prerogatives of the entrepreneurial class, such as double residences and precleared traveler access, and they make up most of the individuals who cross the border on foot, exposing them to elevated levels of pollution (Galaviz et al. 2014). They undergo the harshest scrutiny of the law enforcement agents who control the borderline (Lusk, Staudt, and Moya 2012). It has also been argued that they are subject to intimidating tactics and experience constant fear as they cross the border (Correa, Garrett, and Keck 2014). These border residents are the *governed*.

This does not mean that they do not coalesce around their group interests, but it is difficult for them to do so across the borderline as cross-border contact is increasingly curtailed by securitization. A recent count of organizations active and relatively effective along the border, for example, found that many of them are related to economic activities. The Border Governors Conference, the Border Legislative Conference, the U.S.-Mexico Border Mayors Association, the Border Trade Alliance, the RGV Partnership, the Arizona-Mexico Commission, the Borderplex Alliance, the Cali-Baja Bi-National Mega-Region, the Western Maquiladora Trade Association, the Association of Maquiladoras A.C., and several other organizations, including multiple chambers of commerce, are dedicated primarily to the interests of the entrepreneurial class. Clearly, these organizations are largely created around economic interests, primarily those related to binational trade and investment, and are maintained and funded by the entrepreneurial class. Many of these organizations articulate the interests of the higher socioeconomic classes, entrepreneurs, traders, and investors, and they serve as interlocutors to negotiate with the incumbents and carve out spaces of

privilege for the upper classes. They hold regular meetings, meet with elected officials, lobby in favor of an "open" border, and negotiate spaces of greater mobility for their economic activities. These groups are major clients of systems such as SENTRI and the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT), a program secures fast access to trade lanes (Free and Security Trade program, or FAST program).

Regular borderlanders and citizens and their associations and networks are not as effective or influential because they do not organize effectively. On the U.S. side, for example, they have some of the lowest voting rates in the country. There are organizations dedicated to defending the legal and human rights of the border population, many of which are dedicated to protecting the rights of migrants. Some such organizations are the Borderlinks, Border Philanthropy Partnership, Border Network for Human Rights, Border Angels, the South Texas Human Rights Center, the Kino Border Initiative, the Southern Border Communities Coalition, and so on. Few of these organizations, however, advocate for the creation of binational communities that include merging labor markets that deal jointly with environmental issues, quality of life, and other concerns. Overall civil society organization across the border is rare and difficult to achieve (Sabet 2008). Workers and other border users are the lower rungs of the socioeconomic order and do not articulate well their interests to improve the quality of life in the borderlands. The few organizations that exist are poorly funded and often delinked from each other.

The state of cross-border civil society further demonstrates that the nature of governance in the region is hierarchical and heavily influenced by the ability of different actors to interact with each other and to use their resources and skills to navigate their relationship with the units of governance—laws, rules, procedures, and processes—and the incumbents. The border action field is not, therefore a simple tug between two groups, incumbents and challengers, but a struggle for each to individually and as an interest group defend and advance its position. Governance is, demonstrably, heavily mediated by player skills, as Fligstein and McAdam (2015) predicted, but also by their ability to galvanize resources in favor of their interests.

Political Actors and the Field Environment

It is difficult to understand the border action field and the prevailing structure of cross-border governance without dedicating some time to examining

the broader *political* environment, particularly because the border is not only a multifaceted resource to its dwellers but also to nonborderlanders who would profit handsomely from a remote rhetorical construction of the borderscape. The border has in fact exhibited a high degree of vulnerability to rhetorical construction and deconstruction by outsiders, especially politicians, in state and national capitals (DeChaine 2012). Fligstein and McAdam (2015) do indeed pay attention to the embeddedness of any action field in its larger context. Thus, the border is embedded in a much larger *political* national context within the United States. Understanding this political context is fundamental to understanding the structure of border governance because governance units originate largely in the national capitals. Given the asymmetrical power position between central governments and borderland civil society (Kozák 2010), border residents are generally left to adopt and adapt to national capital-driven designs of border governance, primarily those coming from Washington D.C.

California in the 1990s under Governor Pete Wilson is one example of outsider rhetorical construction of the border for political profit (Larsen 2017). The Texas border has continuously, to this day, been used as a platform for outsiders who profit from portraying it as a lawless frontier and the source of severe threats. Dan Patrick, Texas lieutenant governor, had said that the border was being "overrun by illegal immigrants" who brought with them "Third-World diseases" (Selby 2014). Clearly, the border is vastly profitable as a way of focalizing ideologies for political rent. This has certainly been the case from the 1990s, as the border has become profitable to politicians who are adept at creating moral panic (Garland 2008) and then projecting themselves as the actors who can resolve it. There are multiple instances of politicians referring to the border as a place sieged by "invaders," drug traffickers, illegal migrants, terrorists, and others.

The border SAF incumbents—the security community—have been very adept at responding to the national political environment to advance their interests. Nearly every testimony before the U.S. Congress by the leaders of border security agencies claims that the border is "not safe." As former CBP acting deputy commissioner Vitiello put it, "The security challenges facing CBP and our Nation are considerable, particularly along the Southern border" (Vitiello 2017). Interestingly, public safety, undocumented migration, and violence numbers on the U.S. side of the border have all trended lower (figs. 1.4, 1.5). But incumbents have shown an ability to fuel moral panic around ground conditions on the border SAF and to push for higher material resources, more



FIGURE 1.4 Annual apprehensions on the U.S.-Mexico border (Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "US Border Patrol Fiscal Year Southwest Border Sector Apprehensions (FY 1960—FY 2018)," https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/media-resources/stats)



FIGURE 1.5 Violent crime composed of five offences: murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault—with border cities in comparison to other metropolitan areas (Source: https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-US-2016/topic-pages/violent-crime, accessed February 3, 2018 [no longer posted])

jurisdictional power, and less accountability—all desirable goals for any bureaucracy (Wilson 1989). Security agencies have positioned themselves to expand their role in border governance and have used opportunities to further their goals—including key moments such as the terrorist attacks of September 11. The ability of the incumbents to assert their dominance in the SAF in the face of trends that would be heartening to challengers testifies to their skills to use their advantages. This also illustrates that incumbents are not necessarily satisfied with the status quo at any one moment even if they dominate the SAF. They, despite wielding control of the governance units, seek to expand their own prerogatives. The national political context has, therefore, reinforced security agencies' historical, rhetorical, and structural advantage with little possibility of change in the future. In this context, challengers, privileged or not, are left to negotiate only on the margins of the governance units in place.

The same political context is not favorable to civil society organizations and individuals who would like to see a different governance system on the border. The ability of organizations that seek a more open border or greater human mobility and added attention to due process and human rights is limited. They are hardly ever invited to testify before the U.S. Congress or are actively consulted. This has been referred to as a "democratic deficit" (Payan 2010). Their weakened status in the border action field is an indication of their rhetorical, historical and structural disadvantage vis-à-vis other actors, especially incumbents. It also signifies that border governance is a state of exception not only in terms of law enforcement but also in terms of democratic participation of borderlanders in shaping the borderscape.

Although the theoretical framework created by Fligstein and McAdam does not mention technology, a word about it is warranted here. The incumbents have used the resources acquired from political figures to expand their technological reach, further reinforcing their dominance in the border action field. They have achieved nearly full database coordination with nearly every other law enforcement agency in the country. They have expanded their intelligence apparatus at home and abroad. They acquire traveler information on every passenger coming to the United States the moment a plane ticket is booked. They have grown the database on border crossers and can run sophisticated algorithms to understand "customer" behavior. They have also deployed tactical infrastructure in the field—from cameras to sensors to unmanned aerial vehicles to gamma ray scanning equipment and so forth with the ability to detect nearly all movement along or across the borderline. These are complemented by a growing number

of control centers that relay real-time information from sensing technology to agents on the ground. And border law enforcement agencies are already working on acquiring massive amounts of biometric technology, including face recognition (Owen, Luck, and Michelini 2017). In general, technology has served to consolidate their action field dominance well into the future, and in ways that no other player can match. Technology is, in a way, a force multiplier for the incumbents. Consequently, technology has become part of the field environment as it becomes increasingly integrated into border control.

Border Governance Change and Continuity

Although the central questions of this chapter are how the border action field is governed and who governs it, another key question in this essay relates to the idea of change and continuity in governance at the U.S.-Mexico border. To address the issue of change and continuity in the border action field, this essay examines the issue through the lens of the distribution of power among the actors who inhabit the action field—the borderlands. The position of the actors in the action field over time should be enough to determine whether the field has experienced changes partly based on who controls the units of governance, for how long, and how strong their hold on the units of governance is and has been. Thus, it not only asks who of them governs the border and how they do so—that is, who determines the governance units and enforces them—but also what the border action field has looked like since the end of the twentieth century—what has changed and what has remained the same—as a good way to determine whether governance in the field has been continuous or has gone undergone changes. Examining the action field players over time allows us to see change and continuity in the governance system.

At the U.S.-Mexico border, the incumbents are the security community. Continuously, for nearly three decades, law enforcement agencies have consolidated their dominance in the border action field. They have done so through policies that might rub against their dominance, such as the birth of NAFTA in 1994 accompanied by an impetus for open borders, and those that might reinforce their dominance, such as the events of September 11 accompanied by a renewed fear of open borders. They have built solid iron triangles (Adams 1981; Spar, Tobin, and Vernon 1991) by coalescing with the political community and private industry in order to capture the public's imagination, magnifying their rhetorical, historical, and structural advantages to capture and retain control of

the governance units—laws, regulations, procedures, and processes—and to enforce them on all other action field actors. Rhetorically, they have increasingly spoken of potential terrorists crossing the U.S.-Mexico border even though there is no evidence of any terrorists using the border to attack the United States. They have also changed the language, referring to what are essentially economic migrants as invaders, threats to the American way, and criminals (Ackleson 2005).

The challengers of this rhetoric have not been able to put a dent in an increasingly hostile narrative against border crossers who are constructed as potential major threats to national security. For border crossers, legal and illegal, the terrain is rhetorically shifting against them. The evolution of the words used to refer to migrants has gone from undocumented to illegal to invaders to potential terrorists—all signaling an ever more aggressive portrayal of those who move to seek a better life for themselves and their families. Tracking the rhetoric allows us to see that the trend is now historical—thirty years of increasing dominance for law enforcement. With every new fence, every new technological gadget, every new database, every new camera, every new helicopter and drone, every new agent and vehicle, and every new budget dollar, law enforcement asserts its dominance of the field, putting all other actors on the defensive. The resources have followed the rhetorical pattern outlined above—more qualitatively and quantitatively for law enforcement and less for administrative efficiency, for accountability, for human and individual rights enforcement, and for venues to manage complaints. The material resources have overtime reinforced law enforcement dominance in the action field. They allow agencies to build alliances with politicians, who can claim credit for the increased security, and with the private sector, which lobbies for additional resources as they stand to benefit from the additional resources by obtaining the contracts for goods and services to further reinforce the borderline. Through these iron triangles law enforcement agencies have further reinforced their position by acquiring and adapting modern technologies to enforce their vision of the border. If the foundational question of this essay is who governs, a question central to any governance system, the answer is law enforcement agencies govern the border. In this sense, law enforcement has had the material advantage as well, as its budgetary resources keep growing over time. And the Trump administration has further argued for an additional five thousand border agents for CBP and ICE. Clearly, the law enforcement community has built a self-reinforcing border security industrial complex.

Therefore, if a central line of inquiry in this essay is whether border governance has changed in the borderlands—the border action field—the answer is no. Vis-à-vis the dominance of the law enforcement security paradigm on the border, all other actors are at some level *challengers*, even if not all challengers are equal. The entrepreneurial and industrial community has managed to negotiate certain spaces of privilege for itself, but it has done so often at the expense of its solidarity with other community actors. In that sense, they remain challengers, but the rest of the community, borderlanders, remain *the governed*. This cleavage between the entrepreneurial class and the rest of the community, interestingly, might be by design. Dividing the challengers by opening spaces of privilege for some at the expense of solidarity throughout the border community makes it easier for incumbents to use a system of carrots and sticks to reinforce their dominance. This demonstrates, therefore, that the law enforcement and security communities have been much more skillful than the challengers not only at capturing the governance units but also at distributing certain incentives to maintain community solidarity relatively low, something that amounts to an inability to organize across many sectors to change the border landscape.

Conclusion

Who governs the U.S.-Mexico border and how do they govern it? Asking this allows us to conceive the borderlands as a SAF and the players within it as actors seeking to implement their vision of the border. Focusing on the actors' strategies allows us to discern the character and nature of the cross-border governance system. But the border space is additionally complex—dividing, lines, exclusive sovereignties, fragmented territories, variable legal rights for separate groups, market differences, institutional incompatibilities, and authorities generally accountable to only specific segments of the overall population inhabiting a region complicate the SAF. Thus, understanding governance by simply examining the SAF and the actors who inhabit it is insufficient to understand governance. The field, the actors, their position in the SAF, their strategies, their advantages, and their skills are all important, as is the broader field environment. In this sense sociological theories such as Fligstein and McAdam's SAF help glimpse how the border space is contested and controlled. In SAF, actors are not passive either; they behave strategically, seeking to ensure that their interests are embedded into the structure of governance itself, that is, the units

of governance—laws, regulations, processes, and procedures—that every other actor in the space must abide by. It is understanding what actors have achieved that can then reveal the nature of field governance.

Moreover, examining the central actors operating in the border SAF and how they seek to secure control of the governance units helps us understand who ultimately governs the field—the incumbents—and who are the governed—the challengers, which in turn facilitates understanding the evolution of governance in the SAF over time. Stacking all the actors in the field and examining their strategies and their achievements in relation to the units of governance in the space can shed light on the nature of governance in that field. This is particularly important in border SAFs because of their nature. Actors do not operate under a hierarchical, traditional, and state-centric field. Instead, they operate under governance frameworks that are more akin to networks, market-based or exchange governance systems, and across sovereign spaces where the rules themselves can change radically from one geographical point to another. Actors navigate not only one set of rules but several sets of rules simultaneously. This clearly makes for a very dynamic field, and the structure of governance is more likely to reflect a high degree of competition among SAF actors for control of the governance units. This is key because it reveals that on the U.S.-Mexico border, governance is complex and multilayered. Players pull in their own direction, negotiating privileges and access for themselves and not necessarily moving in tandem toward a single vision of the border.

Finally, institutional deficiencies mean that the U.S.-Mexico border has been unable to develop effective, comprehensive mechanisms for joint and highly formalized governance, relying at a first level on hierarchical, state-centric structures of governance and secondarily on cross-border solidarity networks, privileging competing interest and visions of the border field itself and forcing all players to navigate multiple sets of rules around which different actors will prevail over others. Governance on the U.S.-Mexico border is, therefore, uneven and often burdensome on groups that do not have the resources or skills to negotiate spaces for themselves—immigrants, cross-border workers, and most border users in general. Under these circumstances, dominance by one group and a weakened solidarity among challengers, there is little room for institutional innovation. The functions of the border are intervened by different actors based on organizational and individual interests, and even powerful actors, like economic players, do it on the terms of the dominant group—law enforcement and security actors. Thus, governance in the region is more of an amalgam of

actors constantly jockeying in a highly competitive space with low levels of cooperation to achieve true democratic governance.

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